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Article

Procuring Meaningful Land Rights for the Women
of Rwanda
Aparna Polavaraput
Land reform and gender equality are important development issues in
post-Genocide Rwanda. Beginning in 1999, the government of Rwanda
passed and implemented reforms which granted women rights to own and
use land on an equal status with men. However, as is expected with
widespread social reform, obstacles continue to inhibit widespread gender
equality in practice. In Rwanda, major social obstacles manifest in the
form of (1) resistance to allowing daughters to inherit land from their
parents, (2) adherence to assumptions of female inferiority, and (3) the
persistence of informal marriages, in which wives remain unprotected by
the new laws. Interested actors have documented these obstacles and
proposed legal and policy solutions to overcome them. This article seeks to
identify the causes underlying these obstacles to gender equality. Through
this analysis, I find that land scarcity, vestiges of discriminatory legal
systems, and gendered power structures are significant underlying causes
of these social obstacles. I argue that many of the currently proposed
solutions are inadequate because they do not address these underlying
causes, as is necessary to better secure women's land rights.
The question currently before Rwanda - how to ensure gender equality in
the face of continuing social obstacles - has importance outside Rwanda's
borders. The underlying causes discussed in this Article are not unique to
Rwanda. Understanding the ways in which these factors inhibit gender
equality, andfinding solutions to overcome them, are lessons learned not
just for Rwanda, but also for the international development community.

t Teaching Fellow, International Women's Human Rights Clinic at Georgetown University
Law Center; M.A.L.D. Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University; J.D.
Georgetown University Law Center; B.S. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The research
underlying this Article could not have been completed without the support of SEVOTA,
Godelieve Mukasarasi, and each of the interview respondents, all of whom were generous
with their time and knowledge. Any and all arguments and conclusions are my own and do
not represent the views of any of the aforementioned except as explicitly stated.
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INTRODUCTION

After the 1994 Genocide, land reform and gender equality became
important issues for governmental, nongovernmental, and international aid
actors concerned with the rebuilding and development of Rwanda.
Beginning in 1999, the government of Rwanda passed and implemented a
series of laws, regulations, and policies designed to reform the land tenure
system as well as grant women rights to own and use land on an equal
status with men. The reforms represent some of many great strides
Rwanda has made in establishing gender equality not just in law, but also
in practice. However, as is expected with widespread social reform, social
obstacles continue to inhibit gender equality in practice. That is, certain
behaviors prevent women from exercising their new land rights. In
Rwanda, major social obstacles manifest in the form of resistance to
allowing daughters to inherit land from their parents and resistance to
allowing women to exercise their new authority to own and use land. They
also appear in the persistence of informal marriages, in which wives remain
unprotected by the new laws.
This Article seeks to understand the
underlying causes of these obstacles. Through this analysis, I seek to
narrow the field of proposed solutions and direct the conversation towards
the types of solutions which directly address the causes of these social
obstacles and are thereby more effective.
Post-Genocide reconstruction and development implicates both land
and women. Rwanda has long suffered from land scarcity. Conflict over
land is often cited as one of the major drivers of ethnic conflict in Rwanda
throughout the twentieth century and is considered by many to be a cause
of the Genocide.' In post-Genocide Rwanda, land continues to be scarce
and population density continues to increase, especially as former refugees
have begun returning home. With multiple, competing claims to land
creating confusion over land ownership and potentially planting the seeds
for future conflict, the ongoing land reform process is essential.
Immediately post-Genocide, women made up a majority of the
population and headed more than a third of all households. 2 Post-conflict
reconstruction and development thus also hinges on whether women's
1. See, e.g., Peter Uvin, Reading the Rwandan Genocide, 3 INT'L STUD. REv. 75, 79 (2001). Uvin
finds that "[f]rom the literature [discussing the topic], we can distinguish three fundamentally
different paradigms for explaining the genocide. . . . The paradigms explain the genocide, in
order of how frequently they appear, by elite manipulation, by ecological resource scarcity,
and by the sociopsychological features of the perpetrators." Id. Uvin notes that the ecological
scarcity paradigm, which relies on the understanding that overpopulation and land scarcity
contributed or led to the violence, "is very popular among medical doctors; economists;
specialists in public health, family planning, agriculture, and the environment; as well as part
of the general press." Id. at 81. In this article, I present Rwanda's history with a focus on land,
as I believe it is an important component of the conflict and Rwanda's history. However, I do
not claim that it is the single driver of the Genocide, nor am I attempting to make definitive
claims about various causes of the Genocide.
2. Catharine Newbury & Hannah Baldwin, Aftenmath: Women in Postgenocide Rwanda 6
(U.S. Agency for Int'l Dev. Center for Dev. Info. and Evaluation, Working Paper No. 303,
2000).
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rights are appropriately recognized and addressed. Understanding this,
Rwanda has demonstrated noteworthy dedication to empowering its
women. Article 9 of the Rwandan Constitution affirms the country's
commitment to gender equality and requires women to be granted "at least
thirty per cent (30%) of posts in decision making organs." 3 As of 2006,
women comprised almost half of the national parliament, "giving Rwandan
women a legislative position unique in the world that will hopefully
contribute to their overall empowerment." 4 To ensure the protection of
women's rights, the Ministry of Gender and Family Promotion, created in
1994, is charged with developing programs and policies to eliminate gender
inequality, "to accelerate women's participation in economic development,"
and to assist in the implementation of women's self-determination
programs. 5 Specific to land, it has worked with the Ministry of Justice to
identify discriminatory legislative provisions and has contributed to the
drafting of the Succession Law. 6 It is precisely this dedication to gender
equality that makes Rwanda an informative study on how to achieve
gender equality in land rights.
Working with international agencies, international NGOs, and
domestic NGOs, Rwanda has implemented land reforms which, among
other things, grant women new land rights. New laws were drafted which
grant women inheritance rights and the right to own, sell, and use land,
and empower local councils to settle land disputes. More recently, these
agencies and NGOs, working with the Rwandan government, have focused
on how to ensure that women are able to benefit from these law and policy
changes. Overhauling a system requires overcoming certain obstacles.
Implementing gender equality in particular requires the difficult task of
combating entrenched customary views on appropriate gender roles and on
who can benefit from legal and economic rights. Representatives and
consultants for the United States Agency for International Development
(USAID); the Rural Development Institute, an international non-profit
organization; African Rights, an international NGO; and the Rwandan
Ministry of Lands' National Land Tenure Reform Programme, among
others, have all conducted field studies to determine how effectively
women's rights are being implemented. These studies suggest that while

3. RWANDA CONST. 2003, art. 9.
4. THE WOMEN's LEGAL RIGHTS INITIATIVE, U.S. AGENCY FOR INT'L DEV., GENDER-BASED
VIOLENCE PROGRAMMING IN RWANDA: AcrORS, ACTIVITIES, COLLABORATION, COORDINATION
11 (2006) [hereinafter Women's Legal Rights Initiative].
5. GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA, Combined Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Periodic Reports of States

Parties to the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 1 37, U.N. Doc.
CEDAW/C/RWA/6 (Dec. 19, 2007) [hereinafter CEDAW REPORT].
6. Id. 38.
7. This article relies on the results of the African Rights and NLTRP studies as they were
presented and analyzed in an article by Elizabeth Daley, an independent consultant, Rachel
Dore-Weeks, a professional affiliated with the Women, Peace, and Governance Unit at
UNIFEM-Afghanistan, and Claudine Umuhoza, a professional affiliated with National Land
Centre in Rwanda. Elizabeth Daley et al., Ahead of the Game: Land Tenure Refonn in Rwanda and
the Process of Securing Women's Land Rights, 4 J. E. AFR. STUD. 131, 131 (2010). Results of other
studies upon which this article relies are cited from publications by the study authors.
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the land laws have created positive change, certain obstacles and
limitations to gender equality continue to exist. Such obstacles and
limitations include legal exclusions of groups of women, as well as
problems of implementation, such as difficulties with enforcement. 9 Others
are what I term "social obstacles," or continuing social behaviors which
inhibit the operation of the laws and gender equality. It is these social
obstacles which are the focus of my analysis.
Several of the aforementioned studies identified three major social
obstacles inhibiting gender equality: (1) resistance to granting daughters
their rights to inherit land, (2) adherence to assumptions of female
inferiority, and (3) the continued entry by couples into informal marriages,
in which wives cannot benefit from the new laws. My own field research in
2009 confirmed the existence of these obstacles. The studies also suggested
several legal and policy solutions to overcoming these obstacles. Many of
these solutions focus on countering a lack of awareness of the new laws and
wearing down social resistance. This is where my conclusions differ. I
argue that these obstacles arise out of more than just lack of awareness or
desire to maintain status quo in order to adhere to custom. I argue that
they are also the result of economic disincentives arising from land scarcity,
legal reinforcement of customary beliefs, and gendered power structures,
which are deep-seated and underlying issues that must be addressed for
any legal or policy solution to be effective.
The analysis in this article relies on the laws, published field studies,
and my own qualitative field research. My field research, comprised of
semi-structured interviews of seventy-three people in Rwanda in 2009, was
exploratory in nature. The data are not statistically significant but provide
anecdotal evidence of broad thematic issues related to gender equality and
land rights. Interviewees included public officials, civil servants, men,
women, farmers, non-farmers, local dispute resolution actors, microcredit
officers, public officials and members of civil society organizations.' 0
In Part I of this Article, I provide a historical overview of land laws and
practices in Rwanda as they related to women through the end of the
Genocide. In Part II, I give an overview of the development of Rwanda's
land reforms and provide a description of the post-land reform framework
in Rwanda and the new rights afforded to women. In Part III, while
acknowledging improvements in the realm of land rights and gender
equality, I analyze those social obstacles which continue to inhibit women's
exercise of their new land rights.
Using the laws, published field studies, and my own qualitative field
research, I demonstrate that these obstacles arise in part due to land
scarcity, legal reinforcement of customary beliefs, and gendered power

8. For example, the Succession Law grants inheritance rights to wives and daughters, but
excludes widows and orphans of the Genocide. See discussion infra Part 11.
9. Some studies have found that although dispute resolution actors may rule in favor of
women, the rulings might not be enforced. This is discussed in the section entitled "Dispute
Resolution," see infra Part II.
10. For a more detailed discussion of my fieldwork, see Appendix.
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structures. These deep-rooted and underlying causes must be addressed
when considering how to better secure women's land rights.
I.

A CONTEXTUAL UNDERSTANDING OF WOMEN AND LAND INRWANDA

Laws relating to land ownership have gone through many
permutations in Rwanda, but in the years leading up to and immediately
after the Genocide, one theme remained constant: women were denied the
right to own land. Although customary practices, in principle, had built-in
protections for women, these protections disappeared when land became
scarce.
In pre-colonial Rwanda, land ownership was determined by the
customary systems of ubukonde in the North and Northwest, and isambuigikingi in the other regions known as the Central Kingdom. The former
was a system in which land was owned by a particular lineage, with the
head of the lineage granting access and occupation rights to others. The
latter was a system in which individual land tenure (isambu) was granted
by a political authority and igikingi was identified as common grazing land.
In both systems, the land clients held the land in usufruct and ultimate
ownership rights remained with the applicable political authority or head
of lineage."
During the years of German colonization, the colonial government
introduced and enforced the written law of private property under the
Napoleonic Code. When Rwanda was transferred to Belgium, the Belgian
government applied the Central Kingdom's system of land administration
but expanded the powers of the political authorities, who in turn abused
their rights of land withdrawal and expulsion. A result of the colonial
changes was a dualist system in which the question of whether customary
or written law was applied depended on the region, who was applying the
law, and the land in question. The colonial government, and later the
independent Rwandan state, attempted to unify the land system and
implement written law. Land reform projects in 1967, 1978, and 1991
attempted to create a unifying written law and recognition of individual
tenure, but were ultimately unsuccessful. 12
One common aspect of each of the customary, colonial, and Rwandan
regimes was that matrimonial and inheritance matters continued to be
governed by custom, pursuant to which women were not granted the right
to inherit or otherwise own land. 3 Any rights women had were merely
secondary rights; women were considered to own land only through their
fathers or husbands, who were the holders of primary land rights. 4
11. Catherine Andr6, Rwandan Land: Access, Policy & Land Reform 3-4 (Antwerp University,
Centre for Development Studies, Working Paper Series 29, 1998), available at
http://www.grandslacs.net/doc/1450.pdf.
12. Id. at 4-8.
13. HAGUJRUKA, ETUDE SUR L'APPLIATION lETL'LMPACT DEiLA Lot No. 22/99 RELATIVE AUx
REGIMES MATR1MONIAUX,

LIBERALITES ET SUCCESSIONS SUR LES UROITS DE LA FEMME AU

RWANDA 11 (2005) [hereinafter HAGURUKA STUDY ON SUCCESSION LAWJ.
14. Krishna Kumar et al., Rebuilding Post-Conflict Rwanda, in THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE
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According to some customary practices in Northern Rwanda, a woman
could receive a gift of land from her father upon her marriage or the birth
of her first child. 15 However, these gifts of land were merely rights of use they were presented to the daughter with the expectation that she would
maintain them for her future sons. 16
Inheritance practices also discriminated against women: women who
were widowed, divorced, or separated had no ownership rights to marital
property. As daughters, they were prohibited from inheriting land from
their fathers.17 Under the customary ideal, these women were not left
unprotected. A daughter lived and was provided for on her father's land
before she was married, and after marriage she lived and was provided for
on her husband's land. If a woman became widowed, she was granted the
right to use her husband's land until her sons became old enough to inherit
the land.18 If a woman became widowed without having borne her
husband any children, she was denied any rights to her husband's land
unless she married one of his brothers, at which point that brother became
the new owner of the land. 19 Theoretically, a woman who was (1) widowed
without children and who did not remarry, (2) separated or divorced, or (3)
never married, could ask her brothers or father for some land on which to
live and cultivate. 20
The customary ideal was not reflected in reality. Women were, in
principle, able to rely on customary protections because of the value they
provided to the lineage: they cultivated their husbands' lands and ensured
the continuation of the line by bearing children. However, "as land
becomes scarce, this social model becomes perverse, particularly for
women, whose value is no longer recognized and [who] no longer have any
power." 21 Thus, under increasing land scarcity, brothers and fathers
contested their obligations to their sisters and daughters who were
widowed, separated, divorced, or unmarried. The children of these women
also suffered, as they were not recognized as the legitimate heirs of their
mothers' side. If they were not recognized by their fathers or their fathers'
families, they had no recourse and no means of obtaining support. This
lack of recognition could occur if their mother was not married to their
father, if their mother was divorced or separated from their father, or if
their father simply refused to recognize them as his children. 22
TO CONFLICT AND GENOCIDE: LESSONS FROM THE RWANDA EXPERIENCE 72 (1995), available at

http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf-docs/PNABY108.pdf.
15. REPUBLIC OF RWANDA, MINISTRY OF LANDS, ENVIRONMENT, FORESTS, WATER AND
MINES, NATIONAL LAND POLICY 20 (2004) [hereinafter NATIONAL LAND POLICY].
16. Id.
17. Id.

18. Id.
19. Id.
20. "[W]idows, women in free love, [and] separated or divorced [women]," could, in
principle, rely on their husbands or fathers to grant them some land. Andr6, supra note 11, at
12 n.24. The Rwandan National Land Policy notes that clan chiefs could reserve land to grant
to his "repudiated" daughters. NATIONAL LAND POLICY, supra note 15, at 20.
21. Id.
22. See id.; JENNIFER BROWN & JUSTINE UVUZA, LES DROITS DES FEM4MES EN MATIERE
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The negative effects of land scarcity were felt not only by the women of
Rwanda. Land scarcity is one of the most commonly proposed causes of
the ethnic violence committed before and during the 1994 Genocide.23
During the colonial era, German and Belgian colonial governments
privileged the Tutsis, one of the two major ethnic groups in Rwanda, over
the Hutus, the other major ethnic group. 24 The result was that politically
powerful Tutsis controlled land at the expense of the poorer Rwandans,
both Hutu and Tutsi. 25 With independence came large-scale ethnic conflict,
known as the "social revolution," in which a Hutu-led political party
Political
overthrew the Tutsi-dominated political system in 1959.26
instability and ethnic conflict continued to be an unfortunate reality for
Rwanda for most of the remainder of the century, which included another
coup in 1973. Throughout these conflicts, land was abandoned, confiscated
and redistributed. 27
In the years immediately preceding the Genocide, Rwandans were
facing an environmental and economic crisis: land was becoming
increasingly scarce and the agricultural productivity of the land was
decreasing. 28 Traditionally in Rwanda, households with multiple children
divide household land among each of the male children. With each new
generation, smaller and smaller parcels of land were passed down to each
child. Decreasing household farm size coincided with a decline in both per
capita food production and agricultural productivity. 29 Farmers no longer
had the capacity to let land lie fallow and began to cultivate their land
continuously.30 At the same time, the growing population was moving out
to more fragile lands and steep slopes, which hastened land degradation by
soil erosion. This overcultivation and decreasing soil fertility, along with
3
low fertilizer usage, resulted in overall underproductivity of the land. 1 As
land produced less, it became more important to hold on to as much land as
possible. This is precisely the cycle that creates the perverse effect of
preventing women from relying on customary protections. It can also serve
FONCIERE AU RWANDA: COMMENT PEUVENT-ILS ETRE PROTEGES ET RENFORCES AU MOMENT DE
LA MISE EN EEUVRE DE LA Lot FONCIERE? 16 (2006).
23. See Uvin, supra note 1, at 79. Uvin's article provides an overview of what he describes
as the three main paradigms for explaining the Rwandan Genocide, including land scarcity.
24. Whether or not these ethnic divisions were as rigid in the pre-colonial era is debated
among scholars. Some argue that the two groups lived together peacefully, with the
designations "Tutsi" and "Hutu" depending mostly on economic status. According to this
history, rigid ethnic divisions were not created until colonization. In another version of
history, the Tutsis were outsiders who migrated into the region and oppressed the Hutus
while establishing themselves as the ruling class. Under this view, the Germans and later the
Belgians only intensified these pre-existing divisions. For one take on this debate, see
Catharine Newbury, Ethnicity and the Politics of History in Rwanda, 45 AFR. TODAY 7, 9 (1998).
25. Shinichi Takeuchi & Jean Marara, Conflict and Land Tenure in Rwanda 8-9 (Japan Int'l
Cooperation Agency Research Inst., Working Paper No.1, 2009).
26. See id. at 8 n.14.
27. See id. at 11-14.
28. See Andrt, supra note 11, at 20.
29. See Kumar et al., supra note 14, at 26.
30. See id.
31. See id.
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as a driver of conflict.
Tensions between ethnic groups exploded in April of 1994, with the
beginning of a three-month genocide during which Tutsis and moderate
Hutus were targeted. The impact on both women and competition for land
was substantial.
Two years after the Genocide, in 1996, the government of Rwanda
estimated that women made up approximately 54% of the population and
headed an estimated 34% of all households. 32 Of the 34% of households
identified as female-headed, 60% were headed by widows.3 3 The violence
suffered by women during the Genocide is well-documented. 34 PostGenocide, economic violence35 manifested in the form of laws and practices
preventing widows and orphaned girls from inheriting land, especially in
light of the ever-increasing competition for land.
After the Genocide, competition over land continued to increase,
especially as refugees returned and laid claim to their abandoned lands. 36
Over the course of the twentieth century, lands were abandoned and
redistributed, creating multiple claims to the same land. In addition,
returning refugees caused a rapid and dramatic post-Genocide population
increase, exacerbating competition for the already-scarce land.37
Widows attempting to recover land belonging to their husbands or
from their own families faced opposition from their husbands' families or
male members of their own families.3 8 Women also lost traditional support
networks, as trust was not easily rebuilt between Hutus and Tutsis.
Widows who had been in a mixed marriage (a marriage between a Tutsi
32. Newbury & Baldwin, supra note 2, at 6.
33. Id. Newbury and Baldwin also note that the number of female-headed households
may be higher than estimated, due to reluctance among survey respondents to self-report as
such.
34. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SHATTERED LIVES: SEXUAL VIOLENCE DURING THE
RWANDAN
GENOCIDE
AND
ITS
AFTERMATH
(1996),
available
at

http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1996/Rwanda.htm.
35. Economic Violence is a concept arising out of the Human Security field's "freedom
from want" prong.
In 1994, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
reconceptualized human security in its human development report, noting that "[tjhe concept
of human security stresses that people should be able to take care of themselves: all people
should have the opportunity to meet their most essential needs and to earn their own living."
U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1994, at 24 (1994), available at

http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdrl994/chapters/.
Economic insecurity is thus a
basic threat to human security. Id. at 24-25. Myriam Gervais notes that "[tihe economic
security of Rwandan women is guaranteed only when they can satisfy their own basic needs
and those of their dependents as economic producers and actors. With over 90 per cent of the
population dependent on agriculture, access to the means of production is an essential
condition for economic survival and a source of minimum income." Myriam Gervais, Human
Security and Reconstruction Efforts in Rwanda: Impact on the Lives of Women, 13 DEV. IN PRACTICE
542, 546 (2003). Economic violence occurs when legal and structural barriers prevent many
women from accessing land.
36. Kumar et al.,supra note14, at 54.
37. Andr&, supra note 11, at 21. In 1996, the population of Rwanda was 6,167,000. In 1997,
it increased to 7,651,800, an increase of almost twenty-five percent. Id.
38. UNIFEM, WOMEN'S LAND AND PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SITUATIONS OF CONFLICT AND
RECONSTRUcTION 41 (2001), available at http://www.unifem.org/attachments/products/
WomensLandAndPropertyRights.pdf.
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and a Hutu) were often rejected by their in-laws and denied access to their
deceased husbands' properties. 39 Daughters of mixed marriages also
reported loss of social support,40 likely due to the inability to claim
membership of either group. Wives of men who were imprisoned for
41
committing crimes during the Genocide faced stigma and social exclusion.
In an environment where widows and orphaned daughters traditionally
lacked primary rights to land and relied on family support to survive, the
loss of familial support was particularly devastating. Many women were
left destitute, landless, and homeless. 42 Noting the lack of land rights for
widows and daughters, a joint report of international donors to Rwanda
noted that "there is an urgent need to change judicial guidelines and legal
43
interpretations of laws pertaining to property, land and women's rights."
II. REBUILDING RWANDA: THE ROLE OF LAND REFORM
After the Genocide, Rwanda began an overhaul of its land laws,
focused on encouraging a sustainable peace, bolstering economic
In a post-conflict
development, and promoting gender equality.
environment, land reform is important for developing the rule of law,
managing conflict, improving agricultural productivity, and supporting
sustainable use of natural resources. 44 In a developing country, land reform
45
is a key factor in reducing poverty and promoting economic growth.
Where women are disempowered by tradition and customary laws, gender
equality is an important cross-cutting issue. In Rwanda, a post-conflict,
developing country where women have traditionally been disempowered
and lacked access to land, land reform needed to serve multiple purposes.
Unsurprisingly, the strategies to achieve conflict avoidance, economic
development, and gender equality have been shaped by international
discourse. Some of the largest international development and aid actors,
including USAID and the World Bank, have been involved with Rwanda's
land and agricultural reforms and are also directly engaged in the larger
dialogue within the international community regarding how to develop
Examining their part in the
effective land reforms and policies.
international dialogue, as well as the goals identified by the Rwandan
government, illuminates the narrative under which Rwanda's land reforms
were developed. A close look at the reforms themselves reveals that
Rwanda has taken significant steps to achieve a visible improvement in
women's lives. Together, the reforms provide an important context to the
obstacles which continue to inhibit women's exercise of land rights.
39. Newbury & Baldwin, supra note 2, at 4.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 8.
42. Id. at 3.
43. Kumar et al., supra note 14, at 14.
44. U.S. AGENCY FOR INT'L DEv., LAND AND CONFLICT: A TOOLKIT FOR INTERVENTION 8-9
(2005) [hereinafter USAID CONFLICT TOOLKIT].
45. KLAUS DEININGER, LAND POLICIES FOR GROWTH AND POVERTY REDUCTION: A WORLD
BANK POLICY RESEARCH REPORT, at xix-xx (2003).
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A. Land Reform Goals for a Post-Genocide Rwanda
Rwanda's land reforms were shaped by the combined goals and
strategies of the international development and aid communities, as well as
by Rwanda's governmental and non-governmental actors. USAID and the
World Bank, major players in the land policy discussion, have developed
policies drawn from and applied in countries like Rwanda. Although each
organization advocates a case-by-case approach, both identify some
common factors which were or are present in Rwanda. Both also draw
specifically from their own work in Rwanda, specifying particular
interventions to address the post-conflict, economic development, and
gender equality goals. The footprint of these recommendations is evident
in Rwanda's land reforms.
International land policies have come to be understood as intersectional
in nature, encompassing the previously separately considered interests of
development, human rights, and conflict avoidance. Agnes Hurwitz, in her
analysis of international strategies relating to housing, land, and property
policies, distinguishes land policies reflecting mainstream development
from those in transitional and post-conflict settings, noting that the former
traditionally promoted free-market ideology, while the latter promoted
redistributive policies. 46 In recent years, these approaches have merged
into what she refers to as the "third way," which is more accepting of a
middle-ground approach and emphasizes a case-by-case approach. 47
Hurwitz goes on to note that the links between development strategies and
conflict have only recently been understood, and identifies three recent and
important policy documents addressing these links: 48 Klaus Deininger's
2003 Policy Research Report for the World Bank,49 the USAID Land and
Conflict Toolkit,50 and the OECD Land, Conflict, and Development
Report.5 1 All three aim to impact the development of international land
policies and interventions. 52 The World Bank and USAID reports, which

46. Agnis Hurwitz, Beyond Restitution: Housing, Land, Property and the Rule of Law, in CIVIL
WAR AND THE RULE OF LAW 193,200 (Agns Hurwitz & Reyko Huang, eds., 2008).
47. Id. at 200.
48. Id. at 281.
49. DEININGER, supra note 45.
50. USAID CONFLICT TOOLKIT, supra note 44.

51. Nicolas Pons-Vignon & Henri-Bernard Solignac Lecomte, Land, Violent Conflict and
Development (OECD Dev. Ctr. Working Paper No. 233,2004) [hereinafter OECD Report].
52. See DEININGER, supra note 45, at ix ("This report aims to strengthen the effectiveness of
land policy in support of development and poverty reduction by setting out the results of
recent research in a way that is accessible to a wide audience of policymakers,
nongovernmental organizations, academics in World Bank client countries, donor agency
officials, and the broader development community."); USAID CONFLICT TOOLKIT, supra note
44, at 1 ("In addition to covering key issues, discussing lessons learned, and suggesting
relevant program interventions, this toolkit offers a rapid appraisal guide that can help
determine which land issues are most relevant to conflict in a particular setting."); OECD
Report, supra note 51, at 7-8 (noting that the relationship between land and violence was not
fully "mapped out" and stating that "[tis
paper contributes to filling these gaps, and
provides policy makers with useful directions on how to promote peace and development by
better integrating land policy and conflict prevention").
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draw from the institutions' own experiences in Rwanda, were published
after the earliest of the land-related reforms but prior to the passage of the
With respect to post-conflict
comprehensive Organic Land Law. 53
environments, the World Bank report summarizes the following concerns:
the need to house displaced populations or demobilized soldiers, the
presence of large numbers of refugees, an increase in female-headed
households and widows who lack access to land, a breakdown of
traditional community structures, an increase in land disputes, and
landmines or other physical obstacles to movement.54
In Rwanda, all of these post-conflict concerns - with the exception of
landmines - were or are relevant issues. Emergency housing was an
immediate concern for the New Unity government installed after the
Genocide.55 With many landless refugees, the government needed to
quickly implement a housing policy. 56 Additionally, equality among men
and women became an important theme in the rebuilding process, in part
due to the large number of widows and women heading households who
were denied access to land and could no longer rely on traditional
community structures.57 Indeed, the importance of ensuring equality
58
between men and women was identified in the National Land Policy.
Finally, land disputes are a significant issue in Rwanda: they are the most
common type of legal dispute, are credited with contributing to ethnic
tensions and conflict, and are considered to be one of the greatest obstacles
to a sustainable peace. 59
Rwanda and its development partners have also emphasized the
economic importance of the land reforms. Rwanda's Ministry of Natural
Resources (MINIRENA) notes that land tenure and land management
reforms are a core part of Rwanda's strategy for poverty reduction and
economic development. 60 Rwanda's Economic Development and Poverty
Reduction Strategy, drafted by Rwanda along with the World Bank and
other development partners, 61 similarly notes that "[1]and reform that
53. For a discussion of the Organic Land Law and accompanying reforms, see infra text
accompanying notes 69-135.
54. See DEININGER, supra note 45, at 159.
55. Herman Musahara & Chris Huggins, Land Reform, Land Scarcity, and Post-Conflict
Reconstruction: A Case Study of Rwanda, in FROM THE GROUND UP 326 (Chris Huggins & Jenny
Clover, eds., 2005).
56. This policy is known as the "villagization" policy, pursuant to which the government
of Rwanda addressed the need for housing by settling returning refugees and displaced
groups into designated villages. This policy is heavily discussed in scholarship, but is outside
the scope of this paper and will not be discussed herein.
57. See discussion supra Part 1.
58. NATIONAL LAND POLICY, supra note 15, at 23 (stating that the policy would be guided
by several principles, including that "women, married or not, should not be excluded from the
process of land access, land acquisition and land control, and female descendants should not
be excluded from the process of family land inheritance").
59. BROOKINGS INITIATIVE IN RWANDA: LAND AND HUMAN SETTLEMENTS 26 (2001).
60. REPUBLIC OF RWANDA, MINISTRY OF LANDS, ENVIRONMENT, FORESTRY, WATER, AND
MINES, STRATEGIC ROAD MAP FOR LAND TENURE REFORM 1 (2009) [hereinafter STRATEGIC ROAD
MAP].

61. Int'l Monetary Fund, Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, http://www.inmf.org/
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ensures effective administration, the rights and obligations of land users,
.

.

. mechanisms for land use management and dispute resolution all

provide scope to improve the welfare of the poor and vulnerable groups." 62
Women are considered an important part of this plan. Land rights in
particular are directly related to the economic empowerment of women.
Rwanda's economy is primarily agricultural, and according to a 2002
government census, 92.6% of Rwandan women are engaged in
agriculture. 63 Without access to land, the vast majority of Rwandan women
are inhibited from effectively participating in the economy.
Designing and implementing land reforms such that they respond to
post-conflict needs and promote economic development requires that
The USAID Conflict Toolkit notes that
certain elements be met.
components of post-conflict land reform might include resolving land
claims, improving land access, increasing tenure security, and engaging in
complementary activities such as awareness-raising, capacity-building, and
Land reforms for
developing community-based legal assistance. 4
economic reconstruction and economic development share some of these
components.
Securing property rights - through means such as
formalizing title and developing mechanisms for enforcement - will
encourage landowners to invest in land and productive land use.65 Indeed,
Deininger notes that "the way in which land rights are defined, households
and entrepreneurs can obtain ownership or possession of it, and conflicts
pertaining to it are resolved through formal or informal means will have
far-reaching social and economic effects." 66
The World Bank and USAID policy documents place great importance
on resolving land claims without relying solely on the formal dispute
resolution mechanisms of a traditional judiciary. 67 The World Bank report,
for example, stresses the importance of developing informal, communitylevel conflict-resolution methods which are perceived as fair in order to
prevent future conflict. 68 In addition, the USAID document emphasizes
that where competing claims to land are caused by contradictions or
uncertainties in a country's land laws, legislative and policy reform is
required to introduce clarity. 69
Adding a gender equality element to the conflict avoidance and
economic development goals requires that these interventions affirmatively
consider women's unique concerns to avoid exacerbating gender
external/np/psrp/psrp.aspx (last visited Apr. 18, 2011). ("Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers
(PRSP) are prepared by the member countries through a participatory process involving
domestic stakeholders as well as external development partners, including the World Bank
and International Monetary Fund.").
62. Int'l Monetary Fund, Rwanda: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 10 (2008), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2008/cr890.pdf [hereinafter Rwanda PRSP].
63. CEDAW REPORT, supra note 5, J 19.
64. USAID CONFLicr TOOLKIT, supra note44, at 11.
65. DEININGER, supra note 45, at xix.
66. Id. at xx.
67. Id. at 162; USAID CONFLICr TOOLKIT, supra note 44, at 10-11.
68. DEININGER, supra note 45, at 162.
69. USAID CONFLICT TOOLKlT, supra note 44, at 10.
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In a report culling best practices for ensuring women's
inequalities.
property rights, USAID noted that land reform projects that fail to think
about gender concerns as a separate issue and include women from the
beginning can result in women being ignored by the project or losing what
few rights they had. 70 A gendered analysis demonstrating how women
access and use land in formal and informal systems, and the ways in which
social structures impact women's access to land, is particularly important.71
In Rwanda, this analysis, discussed in Part I of this Article supra,
demonstrates that women were denied inheritance of property, rights to
marital property, and rights to own or sell property. Gender-sensitive
reforms thus required affirmatively granting inheritance rights, ensuring
equality with respect to marital property, and granting equal rights to own
and sell property. Further, because these reforms would dramatically
change the way land ownership has historically been conceptualized,
beneficiaries and service providers must be trained and educated regarding
women's new land rights.
B. Post-Land Reform Framework
Gender equality is a visible component in Rwanda's land reforms. The
constellation of laws, programs, and policies comprising recent land
reforms includes, but is not limited to, the Organic Land Law, 72 the
Succession Law (a 1999 statute amending the matrimonial and inheritance
regime),73 the Abunzi Law,74 the Strategic Road Map for Land Tenure
Reform,75 and the National Land Policy.76 Provisions relevant to gender
equality can be grouped into two categories: those that exist to affirmatively

70. U.S. AGENCY FOR INT'L DEv., STUDY ON WOMEN AND PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROJECT BEST
USAID
PRACTICES 7-8 (2006), available at http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf-docs/PNADJ420.pdf.
argues that "[ijf gender issues are to be effectively integrated into a land project (or land
component of a project), the project design must explicitly include gender equity as one of the
principal goals of the project, define participation by and integration of women as an integral
factor of implementation, and include gender indicators as measures of success in monitoring
and evaluation." Id. at 7. In addition, in its synthesis of findings, USAID notes that "failure to
include gender in project design limited the project's ability to address potential gender
inequities, a failure that either perpetuated inequities or may have even exacerbated them." Id.
at 8. The report later notes that "[tihe most successful strategy for considering gender
differences in the design phase was to identify or hire a gender expert as part of the design,
implementation, or monitoring team," and that "[a] second strategy that was uncommon but
extremely successful was to include the knowledge and concerns of local women in designing
the project." Id. at 14.
71. Id. at 11-12 (noting the importance of examining socio-cultural factors, as well as
customary laws and practices).
72. Organic Law No. 08/2005 of 14/07/2005 Determining the Use and Management of
Land in Rwanda.
73. Law No. 22/99 of 12/11/1999 to Supplement Book I of the Civil Code and to Institute
Part Five Regarding Matrimonial Regimes, Liberalities and Successions, O.G. No. 22 of
15/11/1999.
74. Organic Law No. 31/2006 of 14/08/2006 on Organisation, Jurisdiction, Competence
and Functioning of the Mediation Committee.
75. STRATEGIC ROAD MAP, s upra note 60, at 1.
76. NATIONAL LAND POuiCY, supra note 15, at 5.
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ensure gender equality, and those that further post-conflict and economic
development goals while also having an impact on gender equality. In the
first category are laws which affirmatively grant women equal rights to
own and use land, ownership interests in marital property, and the right to
inherit land, as well as programs which raise awareness of women's new
rights. In the second are provisions relating to the formalization and
clarification of land tenure, dispute resolution, and land use regulation.
Under this new framework, Rwandan women have moved closer to equal
and effective exercise of land rights, but limitations continue to exist.
1.

Equal Rights to Own and Use Land

The Organic Land Law explicitly provides for gender equality with
respect to possession and use of land. Equality between men and women
begins with the Rwandan Constitution, in which Rwanda affirms its
adherence to the principles of the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), and states that it is
"[c]ommitted to ensuring equal rights between Rwandans and between
women and men without prejudice to the principles of gender equality and
complementarity in national development." 7 ' The Organic Land Law
reaffirms the principle of equality set forth in the constitution and applies
this principle to land rights: "Any person or association with legal
personality has the right over the land and to freely exploit it as provided
for by this organic law .... Any discrimination either based on sex or origin
in matters relating to ownership or possession of rights over the land is
prohibited."78 This equality in land ownership laws allows for women's
exercise of land rights. A change in marital and succession regimes,
described below, is also required before this exercise can become a reality.
2.

Rights to Marital Property

Women are finally able to access marital property, and exercise the
equal right granted under the Organic Land Law, via the Succession Law's
amendments to the marital regime. However, although the Organic Land
Law provides that men and women have equal rights to own and use land,
and the Constitution provides that "[p]arties to a marriage have equal
rights and duties during their marriage and at the time of divorce,"7 9 the
Succession Law increases women's rights, but does not necessarily create
equality between spouses. In addition, the Constitution and the Succession
Law, taken together, grant rights to women in civilly-registered marriages,
but not to women in common law or polygamous marriages.
The Succession Law creates a presumption that spouses jointly own all
marital property, but allows for property to be titled only to one spouse.
77. RWANDA CONSr. 2003, pmbl.
78. Organic Law No. 08/2005 of 14/07/2005 Determining the Use and Management of
Land in Rwanda, art. 4.
79. RWANDA CONsr. 2003, art. 26.
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The law allows legally-married spouses to choose among three marital
regimes at the time of marriage: "community property," "limited
community of acquests," or "separation of property."80 Of these, the
community property regime is the only one that provides for equality with
respect to all household property.
Under the community property regime, spouses maintain joint
ownership of all their movable, immovable, present, and future property. 8 '
Any person in a community property marriage who is applying to register
household land must also include the name of his or her spouse. 82 With
joint title, spouses become joint owners. As joint owners, both spouses
must provide prior consent before the transfer of land 83 or before any such
land is mortgaged, leased, or rented over a long term.84 In addition, this
regime also recognizes both a husband's and wife's ability to manage
property, stating that "spouses shall choose who, among themselves, shall
be responsible of the management of the common patrimony."85 Under this
regime, on paper, wives and husbands have equal responsibilities and
rights to all of their property during marriage, and divide the property
equally upon divorce.
The limited community of acquests and separation of property regimes
limit the household property to which both spouses can claim rights. In the
limited community of acquests, spouses, at the time of marriage, identify
the property that is to be considered community property. 86 Any other
property will be considered personal property. As with community
property, the limited community of acquests allows spouses to choose who
will manage the common property.87 During marriage and upon divorce,
each spouse has a fifty percent share only in the property designated as
common property. Finally, in the separation of property regime, spouses
agree to contribute to the expenses of the household but retain "the right of
enjoyment, administration and free disposal of their personal property."88
Thus, each spouse only has rights to his or her own property.
The law creates a presumption in favor of equality: if no affirmative
choice of regime is made, the spouses are deemed to be married under a

80. Law No. 22/99 of 12/11/1999 to Supplement Book I of the Civil Code and to Institute
Part Five Regarding Matrimonial Regimes, Liberalities and Successions, O.G. No. 22 of
15/11/1999, art. 2.
81. Id., art. 3.
82. Organic Law No. 08/2005 of 14/07/2005 Determining the Use and Management of
Land in Rwanda, art. 32.
83. Id., art. 35 ("Final transfer of rights on land like sale, donation or exchange by a
representative of the family requires the prior consent of all other members of the family who
are joint owners of such rights.").
84. Id., art. 38 ("Consent mentioned in article 35 of this organic law is also necessary in
land mortgaging, lease, long term renting or in case there is mutual consent on the right of
servitude.").
85. Id., ar t. 17.
86. Id., art. 8.
87. Id., art. 17.
88. Id., arts. 2,3, 7,8, 11.
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community property regime.89 In practice, at least one study has found the
community property regime to be the most common, with the other two
regimes selected more often by widows and widowers seeking to protect
their estates upon remarriage or by legally-recognized wives protecting
their own interests against other wives in a polygamous marriage. 90
In addition, even when a wife with no such property interests is
married under a limited community of acquests or separation of property
regime, her rights to household land are protected in other ways. During
marriage, a legally-married wife's interests in land are protected regardless
of the governing matrimonial regime. Under any regime, the agreement of
both spouses is required for the donation of any immovable property,
including land. 91 The future rights of children of the family are also
recognized: children of majority age, minor children, and incompetent
children must also provide consent before any owner of household land
attempts to transfer his or her land rights. 92
Despite the advances in ensuring women's rights during marriage and
Pursuant to Article 26 of the
upon divorce, limitations remain.
Constitution, only civilly-contracted, monogamous marriages between a
man and a woman are recognized by law.93 Common law and polygamous
marriages are not recognized; thus, common law wives and junior wives in
polygamous marriages do not receive the marital rights granted in the
Constitution or the Succession Law. As part of its reforms, the government
of Rwanda has addressed this issue by conducting mass marriages in
various districts to formally register informal marriages. 94 More recently,
the government has enacted formal penalties against parties in polygamous
marriages.95 However, despite these measures, as I discuss in Part III, the

89. Id., art. 2.
90. Daley et al., supra note 7, at 134. The authors note:
The most common regime is that of "community property." It is applied
as the default regime where no other is chosen and it is by far the most
popular choice for couples entering their first marital union. . . . The other
two marital property regimes - "separate property" and "limited
community of acquests" - are much rarer in practice and tend to be
utilized by widows and widowers on remarriage or by couples legally
marrying where the husband may also have other "wives;" these regimes
are also more likely to occur in urban than rural areas.
91. Law No. 22/99 of 12/11/1999 to Supplement Book I of the Civil Code and to Institute
Part Five Regarding Matrimonial Regimes, Liberalities and Successions, O.G. No. 22 of
15/11/1999, art. 21.
92. Organic Law No. 08/2005 of 14/07/2005 Determining the Use and Management of
Land in Rwanda, arts. 35, 36,.38.
93. RWANDA CONSr. 2003, art. 26 ("Only civil monogamous marriage between a man and a
woman is recognized.").
94. Brown & Uvuza, supra note 22, at 12.
95. Law No. 59/2008 of 10/09/2008 on Prevention and Punishment of Gender-Based
Violence, art. 22 ("Any person guilty of getting married while there still exist a valid marriage
contract between him/her and someone else shall be liable to imprisonment of three (3) years
to five (5) years and a fine between three hundred thousand (300,000 Rwf) Rwandan francs
and five hundred thousand (500,000 Rwf) Rwandan francs."). The law also penalizes informal
polygamy. Gender-Based Violence Law, arts. 2, 21 (Article 21 states that "Any person guilty of
concubinage shall be liable to imprisonment of two (2) years to four (4) years and a fine
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existence of common law unions, and to a lesser extent polygamous
marriages, continues to prevent many women from accessing land.
3.

Inheritance Rights

Widows and daughters, previously denied rights to inherit land from
their husbands and fathers, are afforded inheritance rights under the new
reforms. The Succession Law, which governs testamentary and intestate
succession, made important changes to women's inheritance rights,
granting these rights to both wives and daughters. As with the newlygranted rights to marital property, however, these inheritance rights also
suffer some limitations.
Under the Succession Law, widows married in community property
and limited community of acquests regimes now have the right to inherit
These spousal
the common assets and liabilities of the marriage. 96
inheritance rights, however, suffer the same limitation as the new marital
rights: they are only available for spouses in civil, monogamous marriages.
Thus common law wives and junior wives in polygamous marriages cannot
inherit from a deceased husband, even if they had lived, for all intents and
purposes, as a married couple. Another important limitation of this law is
that it is not retroactive: that is, women who were widowed prior to the
entry into effect of the Succession Law in 1999, including all the widows of
the Genocide, have no legal rights to inherit their husbands' property.
The law also makes an important change to the practice of filial
inheritance, requiring that parents' property be divided among both sons
and daughters, whether that division occurs during the parents' lifetime or
at death. Article 43 of the Succession Law states that both girls and boys
have a right to any partition of the patrimony - the inheritable estate made by their ascendants while they are still living, excluding only those
children who have been "banished due to misconduct or ingratitude." 97
Upon the death of the parents, Article 50 mandates that all legitimate
children, male and female, have rights to inherit in equal parts. Again,
however, the law is limited because it is not retroactive. Daughters
orphaned prior to 1999, including female orphans of the Genocide, cannot
benefit from these new inheritance rights.
The law also recognizes testamentary succession, but it does not

between one hundred thousand (100,000 Rwf) Rwandan francs and two hundred thousand
(200,000 Rwf) Rwandan francs." Article 2 defines concubinage as "the fact that two people live
permanently as if they were spouses though they are not married while one of them is legally
married.").
96. Law No. 22/99 of 12/11/1999 to Supplement Book I of the Civil Code and to Institute
Part Five Regarding Matrimonial Regimes, Liberalities and Successions, O.G. No. 22 of
15/11/1999, arts. 70, 71. Under the separation of property regime, the first rights to intestate
succession belong to the children of the deceased, and if there are no children, to the members
of the deceased's family. Id., art. 66.
97. Id., art. 43. The article reads in full: "All children, without distinction between girls
and boys, alive or where deceased before parents their descendants, excluding those banished
due to misconduct or ingratitude, have a right to the partition made by their ascendants."
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explicitly state whether testamentary documents can supersede any other
provisions of the law. Article 53 lists the grounds on which a child "shall"
be excluded from succession: causing the death of the decedent, attempting
to cause the death of the decedent, committing false accusation or perjury
which could have caused the decedent to be imprisoned, deliberately
breaking off his or her relationship with the decedent, neglecting to care for
the decedent during the decedent's last days of illness, abusing the physical
or mental incapacity of the decedent to obtain the inheritance, and
intentionally altering a will without the decedent's consent.98 Importantly,
although Articles 53 and 43 specify the circumstances in which children are
excluded from succession or their rights to patrimony, the law does not
otherwise mention when children may be disinherited by a testamentary
instrument. Thus, whether testamentary instruments can be used to
disinherit certain family members is ambiguous under the law. 99
The Succession Law does, however, protect the patrimony from being
given away to persons other than the heirs of the deceased. Regardless of
which marital regime is chosen, the Succession Law restricts transfers or
donations of property of married couples. When the donor has a spouse
but no child, the donor is limited to transferring up to one third of the
patrimony.00 When the donor has a child, the donor is limited to
transferring up to one fifth of the patrimony.' 0' These provisions will
protect the spouse and children from being effectively disinherited due to
inter vivos donations of the patrimony to another party.
Attempts are also made to ensure equality even when there is not
enough land to distribute to all the children of a household, which is the
case for the majority of households in Rwanda. When the land to be
inherited is too small to be partitioned,102 the law provides alternatives. The
98. Id., art. 53. Article 53 reads, in its entirety:
Every legal heir or legatee shall be excluded from succession if he or she:
1. was convicted of having intentionally caused the death of the de cujus
or had made an attempt on his or her life;
2. was convicted of false accusation or perjury which could have resulted
in the de cujus being sentenced to six months, at least, in prison;
3. has, during the lifetime of de cujus, deliberately broken off the parental
relationship with the latter;
4. has deliberately neglected to provide the needed care to the cujus during
his or her last days of illness, although he or she was bound by law or
by tradition to do so;
5. has abused the physical or mental incapacity of the de cujus by taking
the whole or part of the inheritance;
6. has intentionally disposed, 'destroyed or altered the last will of the de
cujus without his or her consent or has taken advantage of a will
which became worthless.
99. Id., arts. 43, 50, 56-64.
100. Id., art.31.
101. Id.
102. The Organic Land Law effectively prohibits the partition of land smaller than one
hectare. See discussion infra Part II, Regulating Land U.se to Encourage Agricultural Productivity
and Economic Growth; Organic Law No. 08/2005 of 14/07/2005 Determining the Use and
Management of Land in Rwanda, art. 20. The average parcel of land per household is less than
one hectare. Valerie Kelly et al., Agricultural Intensification in Rwanda: An Elusive Goal 5
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owners can "agree on the modalities of their sale or exploitation and share
the fruits therefrom."103 Thus, the land should either be sold and the
proceeds shared among the children, or the land should be cultivated and
the fruits of such cultivation should be shared among the children.
Alternatively, under another provision, the land can be granted to only
some of the heirs, who in turn will provide adequate compensation to the
heirs receiving less. 10'
The Succession Law transforms women's position as non-inheritors
under customary law by granting both widows and daughters the right to
inherit. Whereas under customary law, women were considered provided
for as daughters on their fathers' land, and as wives on their husbands'
land, the Succession Law recognizes daughters and widows as persons
with rights to care for themselves on their own land. Although these new
rights are limited, they for the first time require that women receive some
share of inheritance as widows and daughters, a key step in giving women
property rights.
4.

Formalizing and Clarifying Land Tenure

Formalization and clarification of land tenure can achieve economic
development, conflict avoidance, and gender equality goals. To reduce
tenure insecurity and create predictability in the land ownership system,
the Organic Land Law mandates registration of all individually-owned
land and specifies the procedures for registration.105 Registration of land
allows the titled owner to enforce his or her land rights, facilitates land
transactions, and grants titled owners confidence and security in their land
ownership. For vulnerable groups, a registered title to land is an important
tool preventing more powerful parties from laying claim to or confiscating
their lands. For women, it serves as protection from their own family
members or in-laws seeking to deny their rights.
Taking a lead role in land tenure regularization is the National Land
(FSRP/DSA Publication No. 3E, January 2001). Thus, partitioning the patrimony among
children of a household is problematic.
103. Law No. 22/99 of 12/11/1999 to Supplement Book I of the Civil Code and to Institute
Part Five Regarding Matrimonial Regimes, Liberalities and Successions, O.G. No. 22 of
15/11/1999, art. 91.
104. Article 77 of the Succession Law states in full:
In principle, the partition of the property in the succession shall be made
in kind.
However, where it is impossible to establish equal shares in kind, the
council of succession determines the compensation to be given by the heirs
who receive a share greater than their legal or testamentary share of the
succession, for the benefit of the heirs who received a smaller share.
Id., art. 77. Article 81 provides the makeup of the Council of Succession, which includes: the
surviving spouse, a child delegated by the children of the deceased, a delegate from the
deceased's family, a delegate from the family of the surviving spouse, a friend "or a person of
good behavior" appointed by the family of the surviving spouse, and a friend or person of
good behavior appointed by the family of the deceased. Id., art. 81.
105. Organic Law No. 08/2005 of 14/07/2005 Determining the Use and Management of
Land in Rwanda, arts. 30-32.
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Centre, the central land administration authority in Rwanda, which in 2010
was in the midst of implementing a country-wide land registration
program to ensure that all plots of land are formally registered under the
Organic Land Law.' 06 Implementation and service delivery occur in a
decentralized fashion, with District Land Commissions and District Land
Bureaus implementing land use planning and land registration policies at
the district level, and the more local Sector and Cell Land Committees
collecting information and increasing local awareness of land laws and
regulations.107
The Organic Land Law, reflecting the constitutional
requirement that all decision-making bodies include men and women,
requires that every level of land commission be comprised of both sexes. 08
Ideally, this participation would ensure that women's interests are
represented in the titling of land.
5.

Dispute Resolution

Ensuring adequate dispute resolution mechanisms is a key part of
granting women land rights: without an accessible and fair judiciary,
women will not be able to enforce their new, and controversial, rights. The
dispute resolution mechanisms are also vital to Rwanda's land reforms in
other ways. Given the high number of competing claims to land as a result
of years of conflict and mass migrations, dispute resolution is a key factor
in preventing future conflict. In addition, given the inevitable disruption to
customary systems caused by streamlining national land administration
and implementing gender equality measures, dispute resolution actors are
needed to ensure peaceful implementation of the reforms.
Rwanda's approach to land disputes begins at the local level. With the
enormous number of land disputes, sending all land disputes through the
court system could generate a substantial backlog of cases. Instead, with
the passage of the Abunzi Law, the abunzi, a type of local mediation
committee, was granted mandatory and primary jurisdiction over "lands
. . . whose value does not exceed three million Rwandan francs." 109 Thus,
such cases cannot be filed in a formal court without first being heard by the
abunzi. 0
Formerly a customary village-based mediation system, the system of
abunzi was formalized by law in 2006. The abunzi are community-based
mediation committees, operating at the cell level. Each committee is
comprised of twelve members plus three substitute members, all residents
of the cell. Members of the abunzi are elected for two-year terms by other
106. Interview with Didier Sagashya, Director of Land Administration, National Land
Centre, in Kigali, Rwanda (Aug. 26,2009); STRATEGIc ROAD MAP, supra note 60, at 12.
107. STRATEGIc ROAD MAP, supra note 60, at 8-9. The hierarchy of administrative divisions
is as follows: central government, province, district, sector, cell, and at the most local, village.
108. Organic Law No. 08/2005 of 14/07/2005 Determining the Use and Management of
Land in Rwanda, art. 8.
109. Organic Law No. 31/2006 of 14/08/2006 on Organisation, Jurisdiction, Competence
and Functioning of the Mediation Committee, art. 8.
110. Id., art. 3.
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residents of the cell, and cannot also hold an administrative position in local
government or sit on the Gacacan1 bench. 112 As with all other public
institutions in Rwanda, women must comprise at least thirty percent of the

abunzi.113
The lifecycle of a typical land dispute begins with the family, then
moves through the abunzi, and finally to the formal court system only if
necessary. As explained by several interviewees, the first level of dispute
resolution is often conducted by the family, neighbors, or the head of the
village. If no resolution can be reached, parties to the dispute bring their
dispute before the abunzi. The dispute is then mediated by the committee,
and the case is only referred to the formal court if the disputants are
unhappy with the recommendation of the abunzi or are unable to come to
any form of resolution.
Land disputes that are referred from the abunzi to the formal court
system begin with the court of first instance at the District level. They are
not, however, subject to the typical appeals process. If the judiciary
authorities at the District and City of Kigali level are unable to resolve a
land-related dispute, instead of moving up to the High Court, the National
Land Centre is given the responsibility of acting as the relevant dispute
resolution actor.114 Most land dispute resolution begins and ends with the
abunzi - a 2005 survey showed that seventy-three percent of the cases
concluded by the abunzi were not later referred to the court system.115

111. Gacaca courts, modeled on traditional dispute resolution mechanisms, were
empowered by the government to specifically adjudicate certain types of criminal acts related
to the Genocide. The administration of justice via the Gacaca courts has been heavily discussed
in scholarship and media. For the relevant laws establishing the Gacaca courts and granting
them the competence to adjudicate crimes against humanity and the crime of genocide in
Rwanda, see Organic Law No. 40/2000 of 26/01/2001 setting up "Gacaca Jurisdictions" and
Organizing Prosecutions for Offences Constituting the Crime of Genocide or Crimes Against
Humanity Between October 1, 1990, and December 31, 1994; Organic Law No. 33/2001 of
22/06/2001 Modifying and Completing Organic Law No. 40/2000 of 26/01/2001 setting up
"Gacaca Jurisdictions" and Organizing Prosecutions for Offences Constituting the Crime of
Genocide or Crimes Against Humanity Between October 1, 1990, and December 31, 1994;
Organic Law No. 16/2004 of 19/06/2004 Establishing the Organization, Competence, and
Functioning of Gacaca Courts Charged with Prosecuting and Trying the Perpetrators of the
Crime of Genocide and other Crimes Against Humanity, Committed Between October 1, 1990,
and December 31, 1994; Organic Law No. 28/2006 of 27/06/2006 Modifying and Completing
Organic Law No. 16/2004 of 19/06/2004 Establishing the Organization, Competence, and
Functioning of Gacaca Courts Charged with Prosecuting and Trying the Perpetrators of the
Crime of Genocide and other Crimes Against Humanity, Committed Between October 1, 1990,
and December 31,1994.
112. Organic Law No. 31/2006 of 14/08/2006 on Organisation, Jurisdiction, Competence
and Functioning of the Mediation Committee, arts. 1-4.
113. Id.
114. Law No. 20/2009 of 29/07/2009 establishing the National Land Centre (NLC) and
Determining its Responsibilities, Functioning, Organization and Competence (2009), art. 5(24)
("NLC shall particularly have the following responsibilities: . . . 24[.j to act as an organ to
resolve conflicts relating to land use and management which were not resolved by relevant
authorities at the District or City of Kigali levels which were referred by appropriate
authorities.").
115. REPUBLIC OF RWANDA, JUSTICE, RECONCILIATION, LAW & ORDER SECTOR STRATEGY AND
FRAMEWORK:
JAN. 2009 - JUNE 2012 36 (2008), available at
BUDGETING
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Thus, the abunzi have a significant impact on reducing the caseload of the
formal courts.116
The abunzi are also vital to women's realization of their land rights.
They are often both the first and last resort for dispute resolution. Because
they are installed at so local a level and are free, the abunzi are more
accessible than District Courts, which serve larger geographic areas." 7
Early research found that women were able to obtain rulings in favor of
their legal land rights, but suggested that ensuring enforcement of such
rulings remained a problem.118 The government of Rwanda similarly noted
complaints about cell officials' failure to enforce abunzi decisions." 9 Next
steps identified by the government include review of "procedures for
enforcing . . . determinations made by Abunzi, . . . and if necessary

appropriate amendments made to the law to ensure that enforcement is
effective."'120
6.

Education and Training

Following the land reforms, non-governmental, governmental, and
international actors implemented education and training programs aimed
at dispute resolution actors and advocates as well as beneficiaries of the
reforms. Local dispute resolution processes were supported by a Land
Dispute Management Project (LDMP), developed and managed by USAID,
in partnership with the government of Rwanda.121 Field trainings were
conducted to educate dispute resolution actors, including the abunzi, land
committees, and land adjudication committees, as well as advocates for
women, such as the National Women's Council, about the new laws.
Training topics included the substance of the new laws, as well as dispute
settlement and conflict resolution skills. Special attention was paid to how
dispute resolution and the new laws affected women and other vulnerable
groups.122

http://www.primature.gov.rw/index2.php?option=com-docman&task=doc

view&gid=883&

Itemid=95 [hereinafter RWANDA JUSTICE AND BUDGETING FRAMEWORK].

116. Organic Law No. 31/2006 of 14/08/2006 on Organisation, Jurisdiction, Competence
and Functioning of the Mediation Committee, art. 8 (granting mandatory jurisdiction over
disputes relating to "lands . . . whose value does not exceed three million Rwandan francs");
U.S. AGENCY FOR INT'L DEV., LAND DISPUTE MANAGEMENT IN RWANDA: FINAL REPORT 8 (2008)
[hereinafter LDMP FINAL REPORT].

117. Districts are divided into sectors, which are divided into cells. See supra note 107.
Cell-based institutions thus serve smaller communities than district-based institutions.
Rwanda has thirty districts, containing 2,150 cells. See RWANDA JUSTICE AND BUDGETING
FRAMEWORK, supra note 115, at 33.
118. Daley et al., supra note 7, at 141.
119. RWANDA JUSTICE AND BUDGETING FRAMEWORK, supra note 115, at 38. The report does

not discuss why officials are failing to enforce abunzi decisions.
120. Id. at 64.
121. U.S. AGENCY FOR INT'L DEV. RWANDA, WOMEN AND VULNERABLE GROUPS IN LAND
DISPUTE MANAGEMENT: A PLAN TO ENSURE THAT THEY FULLY PARTICIPATE AND BENEFIT 1

(2008).
122. U.S. AGENCY FOR INT'L DEv. RWANDA, FIELD TRAINING REPORT: TRAINING LOCAL
INSTITUTIONS IN KABUSHINGE AND NYAMUGALI CELLS ON LAND DISPUTE MANAGEMENT AND
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Awareness activities aimed at the general population have been carried
out by a variety of groups. As an example, Haguruka, a Rwandan NGO,
has been educating the general population on women's rights, especially
their rights to property and inheritance.123 Since 1995, these efforts have
Haguruka's campaign
been supported by the UN Refugee Agency.
includes the use of posters and legal education booklets to educate the
population about women's new rights. In addition, the organization
provides legal aid to women attempting to secure their rights, and trains
paralegals to give basic advice to women regarding dispute settlement.
These activities are directed towards local authorities and women's
organizations, but some services are also directly provided to women. 124
LDMP also conducted education and awareness campaigns in its pilot
areas. To ensure that the message being perceived was the same as the
message intended to be delivered, LDMP assembled focus groups
including single and married adult males, single and married adult women,
women legally married in polygamous relationships, widows, and
orphans. 125 Awareness activities appear to have been sustained and
widespread among various population groups and conducted by various
organizations, although knowledge of the new rights varies with respect to
the specific area of rights and from region to region.126
The continued emphasis on raising awareness among women, men,
legal authorities, and legal service providers is a positive step. If women
are not aware of their rights, they cannot demand them. Additionally, if
enforcement actors within institutions such as the abunzi, the judiciary, and
local government are unaware of the changes to the law, they will not
enforce them. Finally, those who would be advocates for women need to
be not only educated about the new laws, but also trained in how to
effectively assist women seeking to benefit from their new rights. These
awareness-raising activities are necessary to generate the social change that
the laws create on paper.
7.

Regulating Land Use to Encourage Agricultural Productivity
and Economic Growth

Land use regulations are particularly important for economic growth
objectives, but they also have an impact on gender equality. To encourage
agricultural productivity and economic growth, land regulations mandate

LAND-RELATED LAWS 18-19 (2008).
123. UNIFEM, supra note 38, at 43; Interview with Haguruka employee, in Kigali, Rwanda
(Aug. 24, 2009).
124. UNIFEM, supra note 38, at 43; Interview with Haguruka employee, in Kigali, Rwanda
(Aug. 24, 2009).
125. LDMP FINAL REPORT, supra note 116, at 10-11.
126. Interview with International NGO employee, in Kigali Rwanda (Sept. 4, 2009);
Interview with Haguruka employee, in Kigali, Rwanda (Aug. 24, 2009); Daley et al., supra note
7, at 137 (summarizing the work of two prior fieldwork teams, which found "relatively high
levels of awareness as to the existence of the Succession Law, but much less so in the case of
the National Land Policy and the [Organic Land Law]").
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productive land use, prohibit the partition of small parcels of land, and
encourage the consolidation of small parcels of land. These regulations,
while encouraging economically productive behavior, also create perverse
incentives when it comes to women's rights.
In an attempt to combat the low productivity of land, the Organic Land
Law directly mandates "productive" land use, stating that the land must be
used "in accordance with its nature and intended purpose."1 27 The law
further elaborates on the meaning of productive use, stating that such use
would "protect [the land] from erosion, safeguard its fertility and ensure its
production in a sustainable way." 128 Local authorities are authorized to
confiscate the land if landowners fail to exploit it diligently and
efficiently. 129
The law also attempts to encourage "economically viable development
of land" by discouraging the partition of small land parcels and
encouraging consolidation of property.1 30 Based on the U.N. Food and
Agriculture Organization's standard that plots smaller than 0.90 hectares
are not nutritionally viable,131 the Organic Land Law does not allow
registration of plots smaller than one hectare.132 Partition of plots smaller
than one hectare is thus impossible.
Correspondingly, the government envisions a consolidation program
that encourages households with small parcels of land to consolidate their
land, aiming to establish "normal and adjoining plots of land with as much
independent access as possible, such that, in the public interest, a more
economical use of land resources according to their purpose will be
realized." 33 A program of consolidation is not yet a reality but is
anticipated by current laws and policies. The Organic Land Law already
permits local authorities to approve the consolidation of small plots of land
to improve land management and productivity.134 In addition, one of the
future responsibilities of the National Land Centre will be to facilitate land
consolidation once nationwide titling and registration is complete. 35 The
laws and policies do not yet specify how consolidation is to occur, although
the National Land Policy envisions at least one method of consolidation:
relatives buying back land inheritance from heirs.136

127. Organic Law, No. 08/2005 of 14/07/2005 Determining the Use and Management of
Land in Rwanda, art. 62.
128. Id.
129. Id., arts. 62-65; Johan Pottier, Land Reform for Peace? Rwanda's 2005 Land Law in Context,
6 J. AGRARIAN CHANGE 509,521 (2006).
130. NATIONAL LAND POLICY, supra note 15, at 28.
131. Pottier, supra note 129, at 521.
132. Organic Law No. 08/2005 of 14/07/2005 Determining the Use and Management of
Land in Rwanda, art. 20.
133. NATIONAL LAND POLICY, supra note 15, at 42.
134. Organic Law No. 08/2005 of 14/07/2005 Determining the Use and Management of
Land in Rwanda, art. 20.
135. RWANDA MINISTRY OF NATURAL RESOURCES, NATIONAL LAND CENTRE PROFILE,
available at http://www.minela.gov.rw/fr/lMG/pdf/NLC profile.pdf (last visited Apr. 18,
2011).
136. NATIONAL LAND POLICY, supra note 15, at 29 ("The process of consolidation will be
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A system in which landowners can lose land when their land use is not
"productive" can discourage landowners from giving land to women. As I
describe in Part III infra, enormous importance is placed on keeping land
within the family. The idea that land will be lost if it is granted to women
arises in two ways. First, there is a perception among men that women are
incapable of adequately using land.137 It follows, then, that women may be
perceived as incapable of using land in a "productive" manner, and
ownership of land by women can therefore potentially lead to land
confiscation. Second, among daughters and sons, daughters are typically
viewed as the children who move away from the household, while sons
remain.138 If daughters inherit land and move away, they will not be able to
use the land in a "productive" manner because of distance, and again the
land may be confiscated. Consolidation, although meant to increase
economic productivity and presumably prevent confiscation due to
In its
underproductivity, has no clear, identifiable methodology.
preconceived state, consolidation does not appear to mitigate any of the
disincentives to granting women land.

Under the new laws, a practice of granting daughters and wives land
rights has begun to develop. Many of the respondents I interviewed,
noting that women were starting to exercise greater rights to land,
expressed a belief that gender equality was being incrementally
implemented with respect to land rights.139 One research team in Rwanda,
based on its 2006 fieldwork, argued not only that women were able to
exercise greater land rights, but also that these laws appear to have
"increased legally married women's bargaining power, security and
In addition, the Rwandan
autonomy within their household [sl."140
government has exhibited a political will to implement the principle of
gender equality with respect to land reform: working with local and
international organizations, the government has taken significant steps by
amending laws, training government and dispute resolution actors, raising
awareness among the population of the new laws, and taking other
fostered and the regulation of buying back land among inheritors will be established so as to
render the consolidation of plots effective.").
137. Daley et al., supranote 7, at 140.
138. The idea that women move away to live in their husbands' homes is reinforced in
law. See discussion infra Part Ill. Under Rwandan law, the husband chooses the matrimonial
home. The assumption and probable reality, then, is that wives move to wherever the
husbands are.
139. For example, one woman noted that conditions are better now for daughters than
they were under the previous laws. Interview with 55-year-old widow (Aug. 3, 2009).
Another noted that although families continue to favor boys, she could see a change, as
families were beginning to give land to daughters as well. Interview with 25-year-old
unmarried female (Aug. 6, 2009). Please see Appendix for discussion of the methodology and
locations of interviews. Unless otherwise noted, interviews with citizens took place in the
Northern and Southern provinces.
140. Daley et al., supra note 7,at 138.
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measures to ensure that women's rights are protected.
Although the land reforms have begun to change behaviors in a way
that benefits women, obstacles to women's land rights continue to exist.
Some, such as the exclusion of widows of the Genocide from the Succession
Law, are clear limitations in the law. Other obstacles are behavioral, and
solutions are not easily identified. For example, the exclusion of common
law and polygamous wives from the Succession Law can be viewed as a
problem with a non-legal solution: if women are increasingly sensitized to
the importance of being in a civilly-registered, monogamous marriage to
obtaining land rights, then they can avoid common law and polygamous
unions. Similarly, any resistance to granting women land inheritance rights
could be explained by a natural resistance to such a dramatic social change
or by a desire to adhere to customary rules which had governed since the
Theoretically, these too could be overcome by
pre-colonial days.
awareness-raising and time. 41 However, as I argue below, the existence of
informal marriages and continued resistance to granting women land rights
are rooted in land scarcity, other sex-discriminatory laws, and gendered
power structures, which require more than sensitization and time to
overcome.
III. OBSTACLES TO WOMEN'S EQUAL EXERCISE OF LAND RIGHTS
In spite of the demonstrated will for change and the extensive legal
changes and program implementation, there remain significant social
obstacles inhibiting women's exercise of their rights to land. As discussed
above, some obstacles exist merely as limitations in the law, such as the
exclusion of women who were widowed prior to 1999 from gaining
inheritance rights. Others arise, at least in part, out of the behaviors of
Rwanda's population. It is these obstacles which I refer to as "social
obstacles." In the year following the passage of the Organic Land Law,
several studies and reports examining gender equality with respect to land
rights were carried out, identifying three of the main types of social
obstacles. The first comes in the form of resistance among the population to
granting daughters rights to inherit land equally with sons.142 The second
is adherence to assumptions of female inferiority both as daughters and as
wives. 143 The third is the persistence of informal marriages, both common
141. At least one set of authors argues for a combination of time and sensitization, stating
that "some men retain similar doubts [about the validity of women's equal rights to land], on
similar grounds, and do not want change. What is therefore needed is continuing sensitization
about women's land rights, and a calm acceptance that fundamental change in both gender
and land relations will take a long time; some people will always take longer to internalize
new norms than others, although the process will speed up with sufficient widespread
sensitization to achieve critical mass." Id. at 146.
142. Id. at 140.
143. Beata Mukarusagara et al., NGO SHADOw REPORT TO THE COMMITTEE ON THE
ELIMINATION OF DIScRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN 22 (2009) [hereinafter CEDAW SHADOW
REPORT] (stating that, "[t~he traditional superiority of the man still weighs in the spirit of
certain Rwandan including a great number of women. The division of the labour, the right to
the property and the succession are so related to the culture which the lately adopted laws
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law and polygamous, in which "informal" wives are left unprotected by the
new laws. 14 4
My own interviews conducted in 2009 indicate that these obstacles
continue to be significant for women. I argue that these obstacles will
continue to significantly inhibit women's rights to land because researchers,
advocates, development actors, and other policymakers are not addressing
their deep and underlying causes. Most of the policy solutions proposed by
these players fail to respond to these underlying causes and are thus
inadequate.
With respect to the first two obstacles, researchers, advocates, and
development actors have suggested maintaining and increasing awareness
and sensitization campaigns. 145 Although sensitization may hasten the
slow social process of changing a population's mindset, relying on it
assumes that the resistance to gender equality arises mostly from social
resistance to change. This is not unreasonable on its face. Customary
practices in Rwanda carry weight, creating such social resistance.
However, forces beyond custom sustain these forms of resistance. As I
demonstrate below, two important factors strengthen customary resistance.
The first, and most difficult to overcome, is land scarcity, which fuels the
resistance against granting daughters equal inheritance rights. The second
is the continued existence of laws asserting male superiority in household
matters. These laws contribute to the persistence of customary principles
preventing daughters from inheriting land and wives from exercising
decision-making authority over household land. More than sensitization
and time will be required to overcome this resistance. Instead, solutions
should directly address the ways in which land scarcity and legal
reinforcement contribute to resistance to gender equality.
The
As for informal marriages, proposed solutions are varied.
Rwandan government suggests increasing awareness of the importance of
formalizing a marriage and the dangers of entering a polygamous or
common law marriage. 146 Indeed, government agencies, international
organizations and NGOs have already implemented awareness programs
cannot change them easily."); Daley et al., supra note 7, at 140 (noting, "there is a strong
cultural presumption in favour of the husband as head of the family in Rwanda. It therefore
remains common for men to consider that all land belongs to them and for them to be
considered as the main decision-maker in their family, both within their family and by those
outside of it.").
144. Pottier, supra note 129, at 519-20; Daley et al., supra note 7, at 138-42 (although this
article was published in 2010, the findings were based on fieldwork conducted in 2006);
BROWN & UVUZA, supra note 22, at 12-25.
145. See, e.g., Daley et al., supra note 7, at 146 (arguing that in light of men's and women's
doubts of the validity of women's rights to land, "[wihat is therefore needed is continuing
sensitization about women's land rights, and a calm acceptance that fundamental change in
both gender and land relations will take a long time."); BROWN & UVUZA, supra note 22, at 30;
CEDAW SHADOW REPORT, supra note 143, at 22 (stating that "the aspects of the habit aiming at
the discrimination of the woman must be changed. Of this, one needs an education and a
sensitizing for the change of mentalities").
146. REPUBLIC OF RWANDA NATIONAL UNITY AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION,
COMMUNITY CONFLICTS IN RWANDA: MVAJOR CAUSES AND WAYS TO SOLUTIONS 60 (2007)
[hereinafter NURC].
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to educate women about the rights accompanying civil marriages, 147 and
the government is encouraging women to formalize their marriages. 148
These programs, of course, assume that the crux of the problem lies in lack
of awareness of the rights attaching to formally registered marriages.
Another set of solutions is based on the idea that ensuring access to and
improving existing government services will remedy the problem.
Government programs have focused on developing titling practices that
protect women in common law and polygamous marriages. 149 Recently, to
address the problem of polygamy, Rwanda has enacted criminal penalties
against parties who enter into polygamous marriages. 50 Specifically with
respect to common law marriages, it has been suggested that spouses may
avoid formally registering their marriages due to the associated costs. 51 A
component of the policy solution would then also include some fee waiver
for those who cannot afford formal registration. The government's mass
marriage ceremonies are also designed to combat the existence of common
law marriages. An ultimate solution, proposed by some women's groups
and NGOs in Rwanda, falls outside the categories of awareness-raising and
increasing access to civil registration: amending the laws to recognize
common law marriages and grant spouses in such marriages the same
rights associated with formal marriages.152
An examination of the motivations of men and women entering
marriage reveals that social forces and gendered power relations pressure
women to agree to common law or polygamous marriages. This is true
even when these women know that only formally registered marriages will
protect their rights. Many of the proposed initiatives to stop informal
marriages - focusing on awareness and access - do not appropriately
acknowledge these forces or power relations and thus will have only
limited impact. To adequately protect the rights of women in informal
marriages, the government must instead develop solutions which
acknowledge and directly combat existing power relations. For wives in
common law marriages, this can be achieved by legally recognizing
common law marriage as proposed by some of the women's organizations.
147. For example, an aim of the UN-funded Haguruka educational campaigns was to raise
awareness of the inheritance rights granted to wives. UNIFEM, supra note 38, at 43. These
necessarily require educating people that inheritance rights attach to a legal marriage.
148. The mass marriages implemented by the Rwandan government can be viewed not
just as a means of formalizing marriage, but also as a way of spreading the message that
married couples should enter into formal, rather than informal, marriages.
149. BROWN & UVUZA, supra note 22, at 36 (suggesting that wives in common law marriage
can be protected when spouses in common law marriages who purchase land together are
both included on the title document); Daley et al., supra note 7, at 142-43 (noting that some
women in polygamous marriages manage to acquire parcels of land independently of their
husbands, and thus will be protected if they are registered as sole owners of this
independently-acquired land).
150. Law No. 59/2008 of 10/09/2008 on Prevention and Punishment of Gender-Based
Violence, arts. 21-22.
151. Pottier, supra note 129, at 519 (arguing that "[tihe situation [of informal marriages] is
unlikely to change in the near future, since the cost of a legally recognized marriage is rising
fast").
152. BROWN & UVUZA, supra note 22, at 15, 37.
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The question with respect to polygamy is more complex, but shifting the
criminalization conversation to acknowledge and respond to the needs of
vulnerable wives and children in polygamous marriages is an important
first step.
Women face resistance to their inheritance rights as daughters,
resistance to equal decision-making authority as wives, and pressure from
gendered power structures as soon-to-be-wives. When examining each of
these situations separately, the underlying causes - lack of land, legal
reinforcement of male authority, and gendered power structures - come to
light.
A. As Daughters: Facing Resistance to Equal Inheritance Rights
Respondents in my interviews commonly referenced resistance to
granting equal inheritance to daughters and sons as the source of many
local-level disputes. The statutory grant of inheritance rights to daughters
runs contrary to customary law, pursuant to which land was passed down
from father to son. Unsurprisingly, a desire to adhere to custom fosters
some of the resistance to passing land to daughters. This adherence to
custom can be chipped away with time and education. However, another
significant cause of this resistance is land scarcity: with limited land to pass
on to heirs, parents do not want to give land to their daughters. Policies
aiming to encourage changed behavior with respect to inheritance should
thus address scarcity-rooted resistance.
Land disputes are the most common type of disputes in Rwanda. 53 Of
these, inheritance disputes, often among children of the deceased, were
cited as the most common by the members of the abunzi who were
interviewed. 154 Even those outside the dispute resolution field noted the
frequency of inheritance disputes: the majority of my respondents, when
asked if they knew of any land disputes, referenced inheritance disputes.
When asked about current succession practices, nearly all respondents in
the South and several respondents in the North stated that daughters
would not receive parcels of land equal to those received by their brothers.
This inequality could manifest as daughters receiving smaller shares than

153. BROOKINGS INITIATIVE, supra note 59, at 26.

154. Several members of the abunzi offered estimates as to how many of their land disputes
involved inheritance.
Although the estimates ranged, all estimates were significant
percentages. Interview with male member of the abunzi (Aug. 26,2009) (estimating that 30% of
land disputes he mediated involved inheritance); Interview with female member of the abunzi
(Aug. 7, 2009) (estimating that 80% of land disputes she mediated involved inheritance);
Interview with male member of the abunzi (Aug. 26, 2009) (estimating that 10% of land
disputes he mediated involved a daughter attempting to exercise her right to inherit). Other
members of the abunzi did not provide percentages but made note of the frequency of
inheritance disputes, generally. Interview with female member of the abunzi (Aug. 7, 2009)
(estimating that 89% of the disputes she heard were land disputes, and stating that the
majority of those were inheritance disputes.); Interview with male member of the abunzi (July
24, 2009) (estimating that 80% of the disputes he heard were land disputes, and that the
majority of those were inheritance disputes).

YALE HUMAN RIGHTS & DEVELOPMENT L.J.

134

[Vol. 14

sons155 or receiving lower-quality land than sons. 156
Custom is the most obvious and most oft-cited reason for such
inequality. A broad principle in Rwandan customary law is that land must
stay with the sons of the family. One 55-year-old female respondent nearly
laughed out loud when asked if she would receive an equal amount of land
inheritance as her brothers: "My father would not allow it."157 A 25-yearold female respondent expressed similar sentiment: "That's how it is, it
cannot be changed."158
Even those applying the succession law felt the pull of custom. All of
the members of the abunzi who were interviewed agreed that they would
divide the land equally among sons and daughters if the parents died
intestate. However, nearly all of them also expressed discomfort or
outright disagreement with this result. One male abunzi member stated
that if he could change one thing, it would be that children of a woman be
prohibited from inheriting property from their maternal grandfather,
because, "I want the land to stay with the family." 159 Similarly, a female
member of the abunzi noted that she preferred not to go against custom,
stating, "The sons are the true children of the household. The daughters go
elsewhere." 60 Under this view, if daughters are given family land and they
get married, then that land has gone to another family. Another female
abunzi member, noting that sons are given more land by their parents,
stated, "I find that to be just."1 61
Various institutional actors have acknowledged resistance to the idea of
equal inheritance rights. In a recent evaluation of Rwanda's promotion of
gender equality and women's empowerment, the Ministry of Gender and
to inhibit
Family Promotion noted that resistance continued
62
implementation of the gender equality measures in the Succession Law.1
A 2009 Shadow Report submitted by Rwandan civil society members to the
CEDAW committee specifically identified custom as a driver of such

155. As an example, one young man interviewed that his sisters would not receive as
much land as him, because a small parcel is enough for daughters. Interview with 23-year-old
unmarried male (July 29, 2009). Both women and men noted that in reality, daughters inherit
smaller parcels than sons. See, e.g., Interview with 25-year-old unmarried female (July 30,
2009); Interview with 23-year-old unmarried female (Aug. 26, 2009); Interview with 18-yearold unmarried male, (Sep. 2, 2009). Interviews conducted by African Rights, an international
NGO, similarly revealed that many men felt that women should only be given small parcels of
land, if any at all. Daley et al., supra note 7, at 140.
156. U.S. AGENCY FOR INTL DEV., FORUM ON THE ACHIEVEMENTS AND LESSONS OF THE
RWANDA LAND DISPUTE MANAGEMENT PROJECT 33 (2008).

157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Interview
Interview
Interview
Interview
Interview

162. REPUBLIC

with 55-year-old widow (Aug. 3,2009).
with 25-year-old unmarried female (Aug. 7,2009).
with male member of the abunzi (July 24, 2009).
with female member of the abunzi (Aug. 7, 2009).
with female member of the abunzi (Sept. 3, 2009).
OF RWANDA MINISTRY

OF GENDER

AND

FAMILY PROMOTION,

National

Evaluation Report on Implementation of the Beijing Declarationand Platformfor Action (1995) and the
Outcome of the Twenty-Third Special Session of the General Assembly (2000) 19 (September 2009),
available at http://www.migeprof.gov.rw/index.php?option=com_docman&intemid=136
(follow "Gender Promotion Reports" hyperlink; then follow "[Ascendant]" hyperlink; then
follow "BEIJING FINAL REPORT" hyperlink).
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resistance, noting, "[t]he traditional superiority of the man still weighs in
the spirit of certain Rwandans including a great number of women. The
division of the labour, the right to the property and the succession are so
related to the culture [that] the lately adopted laws cannot change them
easily." 16 3
Custom does stand out as a significant source of resistance, but it is not
the only one. An overall lack of land seriously inhibits effective and
meaningful implementation of gender equality in land rights. In fact, the
scarcity of land is such a significant issue that I argue it is a core driver of
the continued reliance on customary practices which keeps land in the
hands of only the male portion of the population.
Just as land scarcity was important in shaping Rwanda's history and
land reforms, it also shapes how land reforms, and the gender equality
measures within them, are implemented. In interviews, parents discussing
their own land noted that they could not give land equally to all their
children because there was not enough land. This was one of the most
commonly expressed concerns among respondents. With the majority of
families owning less than one hectare of land, land is limited. 164 Two
disincentives to grant land to daughters stem from this reality. The first lies
in the law; the second, in the desire to hold onto land in any way possible.
The Organic Land Law, by prohibiting division of property smaller
than one hectare,165 effectively prohibits many households from
transferring property to all the children of the household. In the event that
a parent does not have enough land to be partitioned among all the
children, the Succession Law provides alternatives meant to achieve
equality in inheritance. Respondents, however, do not perceive these
alternatives as viable.
The first alternative, selling the land and dividing the profits among the
children, 166 is not a palatable option given the high social and economic
value attached to land. When asked, respondents said that selling was not
advisable. One respondent noted that people who sell land become poor
and turn to thievery. 167 Another male respondent said that he "cannot just
sell. Land is the source of everything." 68 Several noted that even if one
family member wanted to sell the land, the other family members would
not agree to it.169
The other alternative offered by the Succession Law, equal sharing in

163. CEDAW SHADOw REPORT, supra note 142, at 22.
164. Kelly et al., supranote102, at 5.
165. The Organic Land Law does not allow the registration of, and thus effectively
prohibits the division of, property smaller than one hectare. See supra text accompanying notes
124-135.
166. Law No. 22/99 of 12/11/1999 to Supplement Book I of the Civil Code and to Institute
Part Five Regarding Matrimonial Regimes, Liberalities and Successions, O.G. No. 22 of
15/11/1999, art. 91.
167. Interview with 19-year-old unmarried female (Aug. 26, 2009).
168. Interview with 24-year-old unmarried male (Aug. 28, 2009).
169. See, e.g., Interview with 21-year-old unmarried female (Aug. 7, 2009); Interview with
66-year-old widow (July 22, 2009); Interview with 48-year-old married male, (Aug. 28, 2009).
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the cultivated product from the land in question,1 70 is also not practicable.
Many farmers in Rwanda currently engage in subsistence farming,
producing just enough to meet the nutritional needs of their households.'71
If an existing household parcel is inadequate or barely adequate to meet the
nutritional needs of a household, it cannot be expected to meet the
nutritional needs of the future spouses and children of each child in the
household.
A third alternative provides that children who receive smaller or no
parcels of land will receive appropriate compensation from their luckier
siblings.172 Unfortunately, when the parents or children have no extra
income or other property, this alternative is also impossible. As one
member of the abunzi put it, unequal inheritance practices "occur because
the parents are poor."' 73
In addition to the legal concerns described above, three factors taken
together - the unwillingness to sell land, land fragmentation, and land
scarcity - generate and maintain community resistance to extending land
rights to women. As noted above, inadequate supply of land was cited as a
major reason for limiting daughters' inheritance of family land. With a
high population density and a continuously increasing population, the
average household farm size in Rwanda continues to decrease. From 1991
to 2000, average household farm size dropped from 1.06 hectares to 0.71
hectares.174 In addition, the Rwandan economy is primarily agricultural. 75
The necessity of land for livelihood and income, along with its scarcity,
creates a strong incentive for landowners to avoid disposing of it. Under
customary law, this incentive manifested in the denial of wives and
daughters of the right to temporarily use land. Under the current system, it
manifests in the aversion to granting them rights to inherit and own land.
As noted above, many interview respondents stated that selling land is
a bad idea. Reasons for this stemmed from the perceived importance of
land. Responses included: "There is no other fortune than the land in the
village;"1 76 "Selling is not in your interest;" 177 "Land is the source of
everything."178 Several respondents expressed a desire to learn a trade,
believing it was a faster and more effective means of income generation and
economic advancement than cultivation. However, even these respondents
expressed a desire to keep or purchase land in order to pass it on to their
170. Law No. 22/99 of 12/11/1999 to Supplement Book I of the Civil Code and to Institute
Part Five Regarding Matrimonial Regimes, Liberalities and Successions, O.G. No. 22 of

15/11/1999, art. 91.
171. Rwanda PRSP, supra note 62, at 97 (noting that "[o]ver 87% of the [Rwandan]
population depends on subsistence agriculture for its livelihood").
172. Law No. 22/99 of 12/11/1999 to Supplement Book I of the Civil Code and to Institute
Part Five Regarding Matrimonial Regimes, Liberalities and Successions, O.G. No. 22 of
15/11/1999, art. 77. See supra note 104.
173. Interview with member of the abunzi (Aug. 26, 2009).
174. Kelly et al.,supra note102, at 5.
175. Rwanda PRSP, supra note 62, at 91.
176. Interview with 55-year-old widow (Aug. 3, 2009).
177. Interview with 21-year-old unmatred female (Aug. 7, 2009).
178. Interview with 24-year-old unmarried male (Aug. 28, 2009).
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children. 179 Sale of one's own land is thus not a light undertaking in
Rwanda. Indeed, of the three respondents who did admit to selling land to
people outside of their families, one stated that she did so to obtain money
to buy medical care for her child and another stated that she did so to pay
for expenses related to her child's schooling. 180 The third respondent did
not provide a reason.181
The lack of land, combined with a deep-seated unwillingness to sell
land, has contributed to land fragmentation. As land is partitioned and
passed on from parents to multiple children, individual parcels of land
shrink in size. In addition, the unwillingness to sell land exists even among
those landowners who move or live far away from the land. Several
respondents indicated that they lived on one small parcel of land and
owned another small parcel that was far away from where they lived.
These respondents also indicated that because of distance, this far away
parcel was not cultivated often. 182 Agricultural studies have shown that
this level of fragmentation has a negative impact on land use and land
quality. Even those far away parcels that are cultivated show statistically
significant decreases in conservation investment and organic inputs, as well
as an increase in erosive cropping patterns. 183 These behaviors lead to a
loss of land productivity, already a significant problem in Rwanda due to
over-cultivation and cultivation of fragile lands. The low productivity of
the land further contributes to the lack of land, as the total amount of arable
and productive land is decreasing.
Lack of land, unwillingness to sell, and increased fragmentation create
a feedback loop, with each factor exacerbating the next, further inhibiting
the extension of land rights to women. The scarcity of land provides an
incentive for those with existing rights to the land to fiercely guard those
rights. Dilution of rights is never likely to be openly embraced by those
experiencing the dilution. In Rwanda, dilution via gender equality is even
more heavily resisted because of the already extremely high competition for
land, which is worsening with time.
Effectively encouraging gender-equal behavior requires addressing
these three factors. Sensitization campaigns alone will not be sufficient to
overcome the negative impact that the lack of land has on the
implementation of gender equality. As long as the problem of land scarcity
remains unaddressed, mandating gender equality in succession and land

179. See, e.g., Interview with 19-year-old unmarried male (Aug. 6, 2009) (noting that he
wants to have a trade and does not want to cultivate land, but wants to have land to pass on to
his children); Interview with 22-year-old unmarried male (Aug. 26, 2009) (noting that he wants
to learn a trade but also wants to own one plot of land for each child he has); Interview with
18-year-old unmarried female (Aug. 26, 2009) (noting that she wants to learn a trade to earn
income, but also wants land to cultivate).
180. Interview with 66-year-old widow (July 22, 2009); Interview with 58-year-old widow
(Aug. 21, 2009).
181. Interview with 55-year-old widow (Aug. 21, 2009).
182. Daniel Clay et al., Input Use and Conservation Investments Among Farm Households in
Rwanda: Patternsand Determinants 12, 13 (Mich. St. U. Policy Paper, 2002).
183. Id.
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rights can only go so far. Teaching or sensitizing the population about
women's new rights will not change the overriding reality that land is
scarce and no one wants to give it up. However, while more land cannot
simply be created, the unwillingness to sell land and the increasing land
fragmentation are factors that can be mitigated.
To some degree, Rwanda does directly engage with these two factors in
its economic policies. Many of Rwanda's land reform policies were crafted
with the intent of achieving economic development and creating a private
market for land. If these are successful, then the unwillingness to sell land
will have been addressed. If off-farm economic opportunities continue to
expand, then perhaps the perceived need to own land will lessen. The
government of Rwanda has also addressed some of the symptoms of
fragmentation by reserving the right to confiscate any land that is not being
However, the discretionary power in land
used productively. 184
confiscation is cause for concern, as local authorities may exploit such
powers. In addition, the threat of confiscation can feed into the rationale
against giving daughters their inheritance, as parents will have an even
greater fear of losing family land: if they gift land in their village to their
daughters, but their daughters live elsewhere with their husbands, then
that land may be used less productively due to distance and be subject to
confiscation.
Fragmentation might also be mitigated by allowing people to "swap"
parcels of land. With the National Land Centre administering a nationwide registration program and creating cadastral surveys, and District,
Sector, and Cell level commissions gathering title information, 185 the
infrastructure is already in place to implement this program. A household
wishing to swap far away family land with other unused parcels closer to
its own residences could potentially submit requests to the local land
commission and find other interested parties to engage in swaps. If people
are able to swap far away land for a parcel closer to their residences, they
are more likely to cultivate this second parcel of land and invest in it.186
Encouraging a land swap could mitigate some of the factors feeding into
resistance to granting women land rights. There is some evidence that
farmers already engage in land swaps on an individual level to create
agriculturally-productive fragmentation. 187 However, on a national scale,
such a program could be very difficult to implement.
Overcoming resistance to granting women land rights requires more
than just sensitization; it also requires tackling economic questions relating
to land scarcity. It is important to note that raising awareness and changing
the laws have had some impact, as although daughters may be receiving
smaller or lower-quality parcels than sons, they are for the first time
However, moving towards equality
receiving land pursuant to law.
between sons and daughters means addressing these underlying economic
184.
185.
186.
187.

See supra text accompanying notes 127-138.
See discussion supra Part II.
See supra text accompanying note 182.
Pottier, supra note 129, at 523.
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issues. These issues raise questions with no easy answers, but they are
inextricably intertwined with women's land rights. The land rights
discussion must be paired with the economic discussion of productivity,
scarcity, encouraging a land market, and fragmentation.
B. As Daughters and As Wives: Facing Legal Reinforcement of Custom
As daughters and as wives, women face resistance that is rooted in
custom but reinforced by laws which continue to assert male authority.
Some of the customary resistance to gender equality in inheritance rights
arises from the belief that daughters don't need as much land as sons
because daughters will eventually get married. Respondents particularly
emphasized that if women get married, they will leave their parental home
and live with their husbands. Thus, women do not need family land to
cultivate or build their homes. Other respondents noted that because
daughters leave to live with their husbands, giving them land is
undesirable. As one respondent put it, "parents give more to their sons
because their sons build their world there. Daughters leave." 188
Under customary law, women had no primary rights to own land; they
were deemed protected because while they were unmarried, they lived on
their fathers' land, and while they were married, they lived on their
husbands' land.
This customary conceptualization, although legally
removed from the inheritance and land laws, continues to be reinforced by
other laws. In particular, article 83 of the Rwandan Civil Code states that a
woman legally resides where her husband lives.189 In other words, a
woman's home is chosen by her husband. This directly reinforces the idea
put forth by respondents that daughters go on to live on the land of their
husbands, and therefore do not need to inherit family land.
Respondents who were parents acknowledged that a daughter in a bad
marriage has the right to leave her husband and his land, many even
stating that they would want their daughters to be able to return home if
they found themselves in bad marriages. For these returning daughters,
respondents offered several options, all based on customary practices.
Those who had given their daughters small parcels of land stated that
returning daughters could return to those small parcels to build a house
and live. 190 Others stated that if they had not received land from their
parents, daughters could return home and ask their parents or their
brothers for land. 191 The fact that returning daughters received any land at
188. Interview with 60-year-old married woman (Aug. 11, 2009).
189. U.S. AGENCY FOR INT'L DEV. RWANDA, WOMEN'S LEGAL RIGHTS INITIATIVE
CONFERENCE 9 (2006) [hereinafter WOMEN'S LEGAL RIGHTS INITIATIVE] (citing article 83 of the

Rwandan Civil Code); CEDAW SHADOW REPORT, supra note 143, at 18.
190. Interview with 18-year-old unmarried female (Aug. 26, 2009); Interview with 30-yearold unmarried male (Aug. 28, 2009).
191. Interview with 74-year-old married male (July 21, 2009) (stating that his daughters
could return and ask their brothers for land); Interview with 39-year-old married male (Aug. 6,
2009) (stating that divorced women generally could return home and demand land from their
parents, or if the land was already partitioned, their brothers).
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all represents a step forward for women, as prior to the passage of the
Succession Law women were only granted use rights to family land until
they remarried. 192 However, the idea that a daughter moves from her
family's land to her husband's land, and back again if needed, persists. A
final option offered was closer to this pre-Succession Law practice:
returning daughters could live in their parents' home instead of receiving
land. One young female respondent expressed the indignity of this option:
"you have to be a child in the house, the charge of your parents ... it's not
good. You have to live in the house like a child." 193
Adherence to these customary principles also prevents women from
exercising the land rights granted to them as legally-married spouses. The
Rwandan Constitution recognizes equal rights and duties among spouses
during a marriage, and the Organic Land Law and Succession Law create
opportunities for wives and husbands to exercise equal authority over
household land. 194 However, respondents noted that in fact, the husband
made the decisions, and the wife could not contradict him.
The
administration of the household and household land is considered to fall
under the husband's domain, and the husband is considered the key
decision maker.
The heightened authority of the male head of household is codified in
other areas of the law. Pursuant to the Rwandan Civil Code, "the husband
is the head of the family."1 95 In addition, although the law recognizes that
both the father and mother have parental authority, "in the case of discord,
the father's decision prevails."' 9 6
The effect of this is that while women are granted rights to inherit land
and to decide how household land is used or disposed, in actuality these
rights can be superseded by male authority. As one respondent noted, it is
always the father who makes the inheritance decisions.197 In addition,
although sale or other disposition of land requires consent of both spouses,
respondents noted that this standard was unequally applied. One member
of the abunzi noted that although the law states that if a man wants to sell
household land, he must first ask his wife and majority-age children for
consent, in reality the wife cannot effectively refuse.198 In other words,
while a wife is not in a position to act without her husband's consent, a
husband does not feel similarly constrained by his wife's lack of consent.
Another member of the abunzi noted that disputes related to sale of land
were most often the result of a man selling household land without his

192. Daley et al., supra note 7,at 138.
193. Interview with 25-year-old unmarried female (July 30,2009).
194. See discussion supra Part II, text accompanying notes 76-92.
195. WOMEN'S LEGAL RIGHTS INITIATIVE, supra note 189, at 9 (citing to article 206 of the
Rwandan Civil Code); CEDAW SHADOw REPORT, supra note 143, at 18-19.
196. WOMEN'S LEGAL RIGHTS INITIATIVE, supra note 189, at 9 (citing to article 354 of the
Rwandan Civil Code); CELDAW SHADOW REPORT, supra note 143, at 18-19.
197. Interview with 20-year-old married female (Aug. 11, 2009) (noting that "it's always
the men who make inheritance decisions.").
198. Interview with female member of the abunzi (Sept. 3, 2009).
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wife's consent, rather than the other way around. 199 Respondents who
were not members of the abunzi made similar observations; one stated that
although women must first find approval from their families to sell land,
"men can sell when they want." 200 Similarly, two other studies - one
conducted by African Rights, an international NGO, and the other by
Rwanda's National Land Tenure Reform Programme (NLTRP) documented behaviors indicating "a strong cultural presumption in favour
of the husband as head of the family in Rwanda." 201
The impact of women's lack of authority and decision-making power is
significant. Many of the protections in the Succession Law and the Organic
Land Law rely on mechanisms in which both spouses must consent to
certain dispositions of land. However, when reality and other laws dictate
that men's household decisions always prevail over women's, these
protective mechanisms are compromised.
The aforementioned customary principles privilege men and support
rationales to avoid giving women equal rights to land. 202 Supported by
certain outdated provisions in the law, these principles undermine
Rwanda's constitutional principles of gender equality, the effectiveness of
the gender equality provisions in the land reforms, and women's
empowerment. Eliminating these provisions will undermine support for
discriminatory customary beliefs and contribute to the gradual move
toward acceptance of gender equality.
C. As Soon-to-Be Wives: Facing Pressure in Gendered Power
Structures
The 1999 Succession Law and the 2003 Constitution provide rights to
spouses in civilly-registered, monogamous marriages, meaning that women
199. Interview with male member of the abunzi (Aug. 26, 2009).
200. Interview with 65-year-old female (July 22, 2009).
201. Daley et al., supranote 7, at140.
202. It is important to note here that I am not asserting that all customary principles are
discriminatory and need to be repealed. In fact, customary law is an important part of the
culture of many post-colonial nations, and legal pluralism exists in these countries because of
the importance of customary law to their indigenous populations. However, as discussed
elsewhere in this volume by David Pimentel, "[clustomary law is irretrievably tainted by
colonial rule, which reinforced gender distinctions consistent with the European values the
colonizers brought with them. The influence of the colonial regime, therefore, interfered with
women's ability to advocate for themselves within their traditional society. Most cultures and
legal systems in the world . . . have gravitated . . . towards greater recognition of women's

rights and interests. African customary law is likely to evolve in that same direction if women
are allowed to advocate for themselves within that culture. Colonialism, however, impaired
their ability to do so, and some versions of legal pluralism, which view traditional customary
law as something static that must be preserved in the present (or ancient) form, would have
the effect of perpetuating these inequalities." David Pimentel, Legal Pluralism in Post-Colonial
Africa: Linking Statutory and Customary Adjudication in Mozambique, 14 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV.
L.J. 59, 70-71 (2011). In the context of women's exercise of land rights in Rwanda, the
codification of sex-discriminatory customary principles has fixed such principles in law, rather
than allowing them to evolve. It is my argument in this Article that to change the sexdiscriminatory norms, such laws must be repealed. For a discussion exploring the ways in
which customary and state legal systems can function together, see id.
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in common law or polygamous marriages have no legally enforceable
rights. Since the passage of the new laws, women's groups have
campaigned to educate women about the importance of formally
registering marriages in order to benefit from the new laws. Yet, common
law and polygamous marriages remain. The immediately available causes
of each - cost, lack of awareness, and vestiges of previous custom - do not
fully explain why these types of marriages prevail. Instead, the existence of
both phenomena can be better understood as a result of gendered power
relations.
1.

Common Law Marriages

Common law marriage, sometimes referred to in Rwanda as
concubinage, refers to a union between two persons who are unmarried but
who cohabitate and behave, for all intents and purposes, as though they are
Studies
These unions are essentially de facto marriages.
married.
conducted in 2003 and 2006 indicated that this is a considerably widespread
phenomenon. 203 My own interviews conducted in 2009 reinforce these
findings. Respondents indicated that not only did common law marriage
leave common law wives at the mercy of their partners, but also children of
these unions sometimes lacked any rights to ask for land because their
fathers refused to recognize them.
As recently as 2003, after entry into force of the Succession Law, sixty
percent of all households were based on common law marriages.204
Although the government of Rwanda has engaged in mass marriage
ceremonies, several respondents indicated that common law marriages
continue to exist. A 2006 study conducted by the Rural Development
Institute (RDI) and funded by USAID reaffirms the 2003 findings,
indicating that in some regions of Rwanda, there are more couples in
common law marriages than in legally-recognized marriages. 205
An in-depth study conducted by Haguruka in 2003 explored the causes
of common law marriage. The most commonly cited cause of common law
marriage was poverty; that is, couples do not formalize their marital unions
because they lack the funds for a marriage ceremony. 206 Haguruka's study
indicated that many couples avoid entering into formal marriages because
they believe that a formal marriage requires certain ceremonial
components, including the giving of expensive gifts. 207 Unable to afford
these extravagances, couples opt to enter into common law marriages.
With such emphasis on expensive traditions, waiving the registration fee
has little impact. Of course, if cost were the only or the most substantial

203. Gervais, supra note 35, at 548; BROWN & UVUZA, supra note 22, at 14.
204. Gervais, supra note 35, at 548.
205. BROWN & UvuzA, supra note 22, at 14.
206. HAGURUKA, RECHERCHE SUR1LE CONCUBINAGE AU RWANDA § 1.1 (2003) (noting that
81.7% of individuals interviewed viewed poverty as a leading reason for concubinage)
[hereinafter RECHERnCHEu SUR LE CONCUBINAGEJ.
207. Id. at§61.1.1.
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concern, awareness campaigns could eventually convince people to
formally register their marriages, while waiting to perform traditional
marriage ceremonies until they could afford them. However, cost is neither
the only nor necessarily the most substantial concern. The expense of
getting married was cited by most of Haguruka's respondents, but it was
not identified as the only or even the primary reason for entry into common
law marriage. Other social forces are more pernicious and are likely the
more important causes of common law marriage. It is more likely that
because poverty, like custom, is an easier and more immediately available
justification than gendered power structures or lack of land, it is the one
that is cited most often. 208
Gendered power structures motivate women to enter into unions whether formal or informal - with men, and motivate men to avoid the
trappings of formally-registered marriage. In Haguruka's study, after
poverty, the most commonly cited causes for entry into common law
marriage were consent, pregnancy, and survival. 209 Consent merely means
that the parties to a common law marriage consented to such a relationship,
but it does not reveal much in the way of motivation. The next two most
commonly cited causes, pregnancy and survival, speak specifically to the
motivations of women. Pregnancy can propel women into common law
marriage. Unmarried pregnant women are perceived as illegitimate or
immoral and risk rejection by the community. 210 Cohabitation, even
without formal marriage, can alleviate some of this vulnerability. Women
are also reported to choose common law marriage as a means of ensuring
survival; cohabiting with a man, to whom "the economic structure gives
power and wealth," is safer than waiting to get formally married. 211
Indeed, even legally-married women suffer from the social pressure to stay
in relationships. In its study, Rwanda's NLTRP noted that "the social status
of non-married women in Rwanda is generally low, and as a result, many
women stay with husbands who are mistreating them." 212
The reasons pushing women into unions with men are counterbalanced
by men's resistance to formalizing their cohabitation as marriage. In
Haguruka's study, the fifth most commonly cited cause of common law
marriage was the desire to remain unmarried. 213 This was specifically
attributed to be an important motivator for men, who prefer to live in longterm, informal cohabitation while avoiding the rights and obligations that
now accompany formal marriage.214 Women's groups interviewed for the
2006 RDI study echo this theory, suggesting that resistance among men to
formally enter into marriage may arise from a desire to avoid the rights that
marriage grants to women. 215 RDI's study notes that in one region of
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

Id. at§1.1.
Id.
Id. at § 1.1.3.
Id. at § 1.1.4.
Daley et al., supra note 7, at141.

§ 1.1.
Id.
BROWN & UVUZA, supra note 22, at 14 (the publication notes that a target group in
RECH-ERCHEi SUR LEICONCUBINAGE, supra note 206, at
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Rwanda, the majority of unions are legally-recognized marriages. 216
Women interviewed in that region, however, suggested that the awareness
campaigns of marital rights had not effectively reached the region and men
entered into formal marriage because they had not fully comprehended the
additional legal protections formal marriage offers to women. 217
In this environment, in which (1) women enter into cohabitation
arrangements out of need and pressure, (2) men do not face similar forces,
and (3) men may even resist formal marriage, women do not have the
power to demand formal marriage. With this power and incentive
arrangement, the only viable solution is to legally recognize common law
marriages and subsequently grant rights to common law wives. Educating
the public of the dangers of common law marriage is unlikely to have any
useful impact, as educating women about the benefits of entering into
formal marriage will not alter their ability to effectively demand formal
marriage. On the other hand, educating men may have the opposite effect
and encourage even more men to avoid formal marriage. In addition, mass
marriage ceremonies cannot work if men resist formalizing their marriages.
Titling procedures would be similarly unhelpful: ensuring that joint
acquirers are both represented on the title only helps a common law wife if
she and her husband jointly purchase property. Finally, while waiving
registration fees may alleviate some of the financial burden faced by
couples, it would not address the social forces encouraging common law
marriages.
Taking these realities into account, the government of Rwanda should
officially recognize common law marriages. The lack of regulation of
common law marriage denies women the rights protections they would
otherwise receive through civil registration; it is thus necessary for Rwanda
to ensure these protections for women in common law marriages. 218
Rwanda can look to neighbors such as Tanzania and Uganda for a starting
point to such a law: Tanzania recognizes common law marriages in its Law
of Marriage Act, 219 while Uganda's proposed Domestic Relations Bill would
Butare had found that more and more women are asking for legal marriage, but in some cases,
men are resisting).
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Indeed, in her article in this same volume, Johanna Bond explains why "[s]tates
should enact legislation that establishes a floor for rights within marriage that applies whether
the marriage was contracted according to statutory, customary, or religious law." Johanna E.
Bond, Culture, Dissent and the State: The Example of Commonwealth African Marriage Law, 14 YALE
HUM. RTs. & DEV. L.J. 1, 52 (2011). Bond reviews the various characteristics of marriages in
Africa as they impact women, and argues that state regulation is needed to ensure women's
human rights. See id. at 9-30, 52-58. As she notes, "[biecause customary marriage law often
discriminates against women, the absence of a statutory alternative harms women." Id. at 58.
Similarly, as I describe in this Article, informal common law marriage in Rwanda harms
women because they are unable to access marital rights to property. State recognition and
regulation of common law marriage would remedy this harm.
219. BROWN & UVUZA, supra note 22, at 15. The relevant text of the Tanzanian Law of
Marriage Act reads: "Where it is proved that a man and woman have lived together for two
years or more, in such circumstances as to have acquired the reputation of being husband and
If the
wife, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that they were duly married."
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legally recognize common law marriage if enacted.220 To adequately protect
women, Rwandan common law marriages should be considered within the
default "community property" regime, subject to all the rights and
obligations set forth in the Succession Law. These amendments, of course,
would not provide immediate relief to common law spouses, but they do
provide protection for those who have been part of a de facto marriage over
the course of several years. I do not intend to minimize sensitization;
awareness-raising will still play an important role. Men and women should
continue to be educated as to the rights and obligations of a common law
marriage, and women should continue to be encouraged to enter into
formal marriages to better protect their rights. However, state law should
also recognize common law marriage to ensure minimal protection of
women's rights to property to which they have contributed.
2.

Polygamous Marriages

Although less researched and less common than common law
marriage, polygamy 221 is also an important obstacle for women's exercise of
land rights.
Although polygamy was outlawed in 1962,222 several
respondents indicated that polygamous marriages continue to exist and
give rise to land disputes between the multiple wives. 223 All respondents
who mentioned polygamy were from the Northern Province. This is
consistent with the understanding of women's NGOs and government
institutions, who have indicated that polygamy does exist, but
predominantly in the northern part of the country, 224 where it is associated
with status or wealth.225 More recently, Rwanda has criminalized both
formal and informal polygamous marriages, effective as of 2009.226
According to the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission, polygamy
often occurs in the form of concubinage and "presents a non-negligible

presumption is rebutted in court, the woman may still apply for maintenance for herself and
her children. Law of Marriage Act, § 160, TANZ. LAWS. [CAP 29, R.E. 20021.
220. BROWN & UVUZA, supra note 22, at 15.
221. Polygamy is a broad term which includes both polygyny (one husband, multiple
wives) and polyandry (one wife, multiple husbands). In Rwanda, as in many countries, the
problem of polygamy is actually a problem of polygyny. I use the term polygamy in this
paper to maintain consistency with the terminology used by the government of Rwanda and
by international and non-governmental groups in the country.
222. BROWN & UVUZA, supra note 22, at 16.
223. U.S. AGENCY FOR INT'L DEV. RWANDA, FORUM ON THE ACHIEVEMENTS AND LESSONS OF
THE RWANDA LAND DISPUTE MANAGEMENT PROJECT 34 (2008); Interview with 56-year-old

widow (Aug. 21, 2009); Interview with 18-year-old unmarried female (Sept. 2, 2009); interview
with male member of the abunzi (Aug. 26, 2009).
224. Interview with civil society employee (Aug. 24, 2009); Interview with Didier
Sagashya, Director of Land Administration, National Land Centre (Aug. 26, 2009); NURC,
supra note 146, at 43.
225. Daley et al., supra note 7, at 138. This article also notes that in southern Rwanda,
"polygamy has often been associated with poverty and the need for cheap labour," but it does
not argue that polygamy occurs in southern Rwanda.
226. Law No. 59/2008 of 10/09/2008 on Prevention and Punishment of Gender-Based
Violence, arts. 21-22.
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gravity." 227 When polygamy takes the form of concubinage, men have de
facto marriages with several women, creating in essence a polygamous
marriage. Rwanda's new law addresses both possibilities, criminalizing
polygamy both via formal marriage and via concubinage.228 Within this
existing legal regime, junior wives in polygamous unions, whether via
concubinage or traditional polygamous marriage, cannot benefit from the
new land rights. In addition, the way in which polygamy has been
criminalized may harm, rather than help, these wives.
Because polygamous marriages are not recognized by the government,
any wives after the first wife cannot be accorded legal protection. In
theory, these wives do not need such protection, as there is an expectation
that a man in a polygamous marriage gives different parcels of land to each
of his wives. 229 This arrangement is not always a reality, however, due to
the lack of land. The first wife, provided that her marriage is formalized
under civil law, is the only one with any rights to the titled property upon
divorce or her husband's death. Later wives and their children remain
unprotected. An NLTRP finding illustrates how problematic this can be: in
practice, when a husband gives land to a junior wife, the junior wife defers
to her husband as head of household and requires his consent for any
decisions made with respect to that land. 230 However, if he wants to sell
that same land, the law requires that he obtain consent from the legal wife;
the junior wife has no say. 231 Upon death of or divorce from her husband, a
junior wife and her children may have no legally recognizable rights under
the Succession Law.
In some situations, the children of junior wives are better positioned
than the children of legal wives. Some junior wives acquire their own
parcels of land "independently of their husbands." 232 Their husbands are
not recorded as joint owners because their marriage is not legally
recognized.233 If the children of these junior wives are recognized by their
father, then they have the right to inherit, equally with all the other children
of the father, from their father's share of the legally-recognized marital
property, as well as the right to inherit from their mother's 100% share of
her own property. Children of the legal wife, on the other hand, also have a
right to inherit from their father's 50% share of marital property, but may
only inherit from their mother's 50% share of that same marital property.
Despite this interesting legal loophole, the overall effect of polygamy is
harmful to women. With respect to land rights, the National Unity and
Reconciliation Commission notes, "The progeny from such unions are after
227. NURC, supra note 146, at 49.
228. Law No. 59/2008 of 10/09/2008 on Prevention and Punishment of Gender-Based
Violence, arts. 21-22.
229. See Daley et al., supra note 7, at 143. See also Interview with 56-year-old widow (Aug.
21, 2009); Interview with 43-year-old widow (Aug. 21, 2009); Interview with male member of
the abunzi (July 24, 2009).
230. Daley et al., supra note 7, at142.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 143.
233. Id. This is also theoretically a possibility for common law wives.
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deprived of their rights, chiefly when they are not recognized by their
fathers. Furthermore, illegally espoused wives are after driven away at
their husband's death." 234
Rwanda has an interest in refusing to acknowledge polygamous
marriages as legitimate. When concubinage leads to monogamous, common
law marriages, women suffer because they cannot receive the legal benefits
of the union. This can be remedied by the government recognizing
common law marriage. However, when concubinage leads to de facto
polygamous marriages, the harms extend beyond the lack of legal benefits.
Polygamy is harmful to women 235 and violates their legal rights: among
other things, polygamous marriages violate the principle of gender equality
set forth in the constitution and in the CEDAW,23 6 to which Rwanda is
legally bound. NURC cites polygamy as "nurtur[ing] violence" against
women,237 and contributing to the "pauperization" of the Rwandan
population because multiple wives and children must share a meager
income. 238
At the same time, mere discouragement of polygamous marriages is
unlikely to prevent them from occurring. As with common law marriages,
gendered power structures inhibit women from controlling the types of
marriages into which they enter. 239 After the Genocide, women greatly
outnumbered men, and polygamy was considered by some to be a solution
to this imbalance. 240 It follows then that in combination with the same
social and economic forces pressuring women into common law marriages,
the substantially reduced male population left women with no meaningful
alternatives as either a first wife confronted with her husband's desire for
multiple wives (especially as prior to 1999 she would have had no rights to
property upon divorce), or as a second or third wife with few prospects.
Unfortunately, even after the population leveled out and the demographic
concerns decreased, women have continued to reside in a position
characterized by a relative lack of power, meaning that when pushed into
Additionally, the
polygamous marriages, they have little choice.
government must contend not just with traditional polygamy, which is
prohibited, but also with the more commonly occurring de facto polygamy,
which is caused by concubinage. The latter is difficult to clearly fit within
234. NURC, supra note 146, at 44.
235. For an overview of the harms of polygyny, see generally Susan Deller Ross, Polygyny
as a Violation of Women's Right to Equality in Marriage: An Historical, Comparative and International
Human Rights Overview, 24 DELHi L. REv. 22 (2002).
236. The Convention as a whole reinforces the importance of removing all forms of
discrimination against women, and Article 15(1) requires that "States Parties shall accord to
women equality with men before the law." Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, entered into force Sept. 3, 1981, ratified by Rwanda Mar. 2, 1981,
available at http:/ /www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cedaw.htm.
237. NURC, supra note146, at 44.
238. Id. at 60.
239. See supra text accompanying notes 199-216.
240. Judy El-Bushra, Transforming Conflict: Some Thoughts on a Gendered Understanding of
Conflict Processes, in STATES OF CONFLICT: GENDER, VIOLENCE, AND RESISTANCE 66, 73-74 (Susie
Jacobs, Ruth Jacobsen & Jen Marchbank, eds., 2000).
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legal parameters.
Ideal circumstances would yield a policy which effectively protects the
property rights of wives and children in polygamous marriages while
avoiding legitimizing those marriages. However, this does not seem
possible working within the civil and land-related framework. Affording
protection to polygamous wives as common law wives is untenable, as it
would amount to government recognition and acceptance of polygamy.
Another option under consideration by the government of Rwanda is
granting junior wives a special lien or interest in household land. 241
However, this option is limited by mechanisms in the Succession Law
which exist to protect the inheritance of wives and children. A married
man with no children is limited to making inter vivos donations of property
no greater than one third of the total household property, and a married
man with children is limited to inter vivos donations no greater than one
fifth of the total household property. 242 Respecting these protections means
that second and third wives must share in a small fraction of their
husband's property. This problem can be addressed by building in an
exception to the limitations on inter vivos donations when the donation is to
an additional wife. This type of exception, however, will again translate
into government recognition and acceptance of polygamy. Working within
the existing land and inheritance framework has the government of
Rwanda attempting the impossible task of protecting wives in polygamous
marriages without recognizing polygamy outright.
Treating polygamy as a crime could potentially protect the multiple
wives in a polygamous marriage while allowing the state to condemn the
practice; however, the way in which Rwanda has criminalized polygamy
does not afford any protection to junior wives. How and whether the law
impacts practice remains to be seen.
As written, it is problematic.
Rwanda's Gender-Based Violence Law provides that "any person guilty of
getting married while there still exists a valid marriage contract between
him/her and someone else" as well as "any person who accepts to get
married to someone else knowing the latter has another valid marriage
contract with someone else" are liable to three to five years of
imprisonment and a fine between 300,000 and 500,000 Rwandan francs. 243
241. Interview with Didier Sagashya, Director of Land Administration, National Land
Centre, in Kigali, Rwanda (Aug. 26, 2009).
242. Law No. 22/99 of 12/11/1999 to Supplement Book I of the Civil Code and to Institute
Part Five Regarding Matrimonial Regimes, Liberalities and Successions, O.G. No. 22 of
15/11/1999, art. 31.
243. Law No. 59/2008 of 10/09/2008 on Prevention and Punishment of Gender-Based
Violence, art. 22. Article 22 states in full:
Any person guilty of getting married while there still exists a valid
marriage contract between him/her and someone else shall be liable to
imprisonment of three (3) years to five (5) years and a fine between three
hundred thousand (300,000 Rwf) Rwandan francs and five hundred
thousand (500,000 Rwf) Rwandan francs.
Penalties provided for in the paragraph One of this Article shall apply to
any person who accepts to get married to someone else knowing that the
latter has another valid marriage contract with someone else.
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Similarly, any person who engages in polygamy via concubinage, including
as a husband or informal junior wife, is liable to imprisonment of two to
four years and a fine between 100,000 and 200,000 Rwandan francs.244
Interestingly, parties to an entirely informal polygamous marriage - that is,
a polygamous marriage in which no party has a legally valid marriage
contract with any other party - do not appear to fall within the penalty. 245
While this law condemns the practice of polygamy, it fails to recognize
the relatively powerless position of wives in situations of formal polygamy
or concubinage. The burdens of being in a polygamous marriage fall
squarely on the wives, who suffer from disempowerment, inequality, and
being forced to share marital resources with the other wives. 246 Any
criminalization of polygamy should take this into account acknowledging
that many wives and children are victims. Rwanda's criminalization
provides protection for senior, legally-married wives, in that they can

Any person involved intentionally in polygamy by issuing documents or
officiating marriage shall be liable to imprisonment sentence of five (5)
years to eight (8) years.
244. Gender-Based Violence Law, art. 21. Article 21 states in full:
Any person guilty of concubinage shall be liable to imprisonment of two
(2) years to four (4) years and a fine between one hundred thousand
(100,000 Rwf) Rwandan francs and two hundred thousand (200,000 Rwf)
Rwandan francs.
Penalties provided for in the paragraph One of this Article shall apply to
any person accepting to become a concubine.
Concubinage is defined as "the fact that two people live permanently as if they were spouses
though they are not married while one of them is legally married." Gender-Based Violence
Law, art. 2(4).
245. The law later states that those entertaining unlawful marriages shall be married
monogamously, and any such person living with several husbands or wives must first
distribute common property equally among those spouses. It is unclear what this provision is
meant to do, but it appears to protect those men and women who are living as if in a
polygamous marriage, without any valid contract of marriage between any of them. GenderBased Violence Law, art. 39 (providing that, "[tlhose people entertaining unlawful marriages
shall be married in accordance with the monogamous principle. If a person concerned with
the provision of previous paragraph of this article was living with many husbands/wives, he
shall first of all share the commonly owned belongings with those husbands/wives equally.").
246. Ross, supra note 235, at 34. Ross argues:
Although polygyny violates many different human rights of women, it
violates their right to equality in marriage and in the most egregious way
possible. To understand the violation in depth, it is necessary to consider
the common legal "rights and responsibilities" states attach to marriage in
their legal systems. They include child support, child custody, spousal
maintenance, spousal property ownership and control, spousal and child
inheritance, spousal obligations to care for their children and each other,
divorce, matrimonial property rights, spousal sexual fidelity, and sexual
intercourse.
In a polygamous system, equality of rights and responsibilities as to these
subjects is literally impossible. If a man has four wives, each wife has only
one-fourth a husband. Accordingly, he will be responsible to spend only
one-fourth of the resources he has on the children he has with each of his
wives. .. . With scarce resources the norm in the underdeveloped world,
polygyny necessarily impoverishes the wives and their children. The
wives have fewer rights than their husbands, and the husbands fewer
responsibilities than their wives.
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refuse to allow their husbands to take junior wives. However, this same
criminalization does not protect junior wives. Nor does it provide
protections for the children of junior wives, who may still not have any
rights to the marital property. The law places junior wives at an equal risk
of liability as their polygamous husbands, discouraging them from
attempting to assert their own rights. Children of such wives run the risk
of sending their mothers to jail if they assert inheritance rights to their
father's land. In the case of polygamy via concubinage, the junior wives who
were not committing a crime prior to this law will be committing a crime if
they continue a relationship with their husband. They may also be guilty of
adultery, which is criminalized pursuant to the same law. 247 Additionally,
women who are in polygamous relationships which were entered into prior
to enactment of this law, although not liable to criminal penalty as the law
does not contain retroactive provisions, are still unable to lay claim to
marital property.
Although criminalization should certainly not be ruled out as an
option, criminalization unaccompanied by protections for the wives and
their children does not address the harms suffered by these wives and their
children. Subjecting junior wives to automatic criminal penalty ignores
their vulnerabilities. In addition, the economic harm suffered by wives and
children in polygamous marriages remains unaddressed by this law. A
more nuanced approach could begin with the understanding that wives
and children may need to be legally recognized and compensated as
victims. Children should not be discouraged from asserting claims to land
because their mothers might be imprisoned for a concubinage relationship
which was legal prior to the effectiveness of this law. The law should also
be aware that senior wives may be complicit in coercing additional
marriages. Women in polygamous marriages entered into prior to the
entry into effect of this law are still unable to exercise land rights. Crafting
such a criminal statute would by no means be easy, but ignoring the
complexity may inadequately protect or actually harm vulnerable wives, as
described above.
The conversation about polygamy is a necessary but complex one. As a
continuing concern, the practice prevents women from benefitting from the
new land reforms. Raising awareness about the harms of polygamy is
insufficient, as gendered power structures, pushing women into polygamy
Legally
via concubinage, cannot be countered solely by awareness.
recognizing polygamy is not desirable because of the harms it causes. On
the other hand, simple criminalization which per se punishes junior wives
neither protects vulnerable wives, nor does it address the land-related
concerns. Nonetheless, fully securing the land rights of women requires
addressing this problem.

247. Law No. 59/20U8 of 1U/09/2008 on Prevention and Punishment of Gender-Based
Violence, art. 14. Article 14 provides that "[amny person convicted with adultery shall be liable
to imprisonment sentence of between six (6) months and two (2) years." Id. Adultery is
defined as "the fact of having sex with a person who is married to someone else." Id. art. 2(5).
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CONCLUSION

Having already taken numerous steps to ensure gender equality in land
law, it is now time for Rwanda to address those underlying forces
inhibiting the implementation of gender equality.
The generalized
resistance to granting daughters inheritance rights and the continued
assumptions of female inferiority, preserving ideas that women neither
need land nor should have decision-making power with respect to land,
cannot be explained simply by custom. At least some of the significant,
underlying factors contributing to the generalized resistance are land
scarcity and the legal reinforcement of customary ideas of male superiority.
Similarly, the persistence of informal marriages, in which wives lack the
legal protections afforded to wives in formal marriages, cannot be
explained simply by lack of awareness or access. Informal marriages can be
better understood as resulting from unequal and gendered power relations
that place women at a disadvantage. Understanding these underlying
causes of generalized resistance and informal marriages puts Rwanda in a
better position to protect the new land rights granted to women.
Policies and legal changes targeted to counter these underlying factors
will be more effective in removing the social obstacles inhibiting gender
equality in land rights. Vestigial laws perpetuating gender inequality
should be identified and repealed. Given the social factors encouraging
women to enter into common law marriages, even when aware of the fact
that land rights only accompany civilly registered marriages, Rwanda
should recognize common law marriages. The disincentives arising from
land scarcity and the continued existence of polygamous marriages are
more difficult issues to address. Acknowledging them, however, is a
starting point for developing policies which reduce resistance to granting
women land rights and limit the number of women who remain
unprotected by Rwanda's land reforms. One team of researchers has noted
that "it may never be possible to secure all women's land rights." 248 While
that is probably true, Rwanda is still in a position to secure the land rights
of more women than it currently does.
Land reform and gender equality are headline issues among
development actors and developing nations. Rwanda, working with some
of the major players in development, has already taken a number of steps to
grant women rights to land and to protect those rights. As the successes
and limitations of these reforms become more apparent, they shape the
international dialogue relating to land reform, development, and conflict.
In addition, the question of how to ensure gender equality in the face of
continuing social obstacles has importance outside Rwanda's borders. The
decline of productive land is a problem throughout sub-Saharan Africa. 249
248. Daley et al., supranote 7, at 145.
249. In a 1996 report, the Food and Agricultural Organization noted that in sub-Saharan
Africa,
under increasing population pressure, available land per person is falling
rapidly, and this means that fallow periods, the traditional resting time for
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The persistence of customary norms asserting male superiority as well as
informal marriages also exists elsewhere. In South Africa, for example,
although statutes grant women in customary marriages capacity to
administer household property, "many marriages remain governed by
customary rules whereby men make most decisions on the administration
of family property." 250 In Tanzania, although the Law of Marriage Act
contains provisions protecting wives' interests in marital property, many
women cannot benefit from these provisions because their marriages are
not legally registered. 251 Moreover, these problems are not limited to
Africa. For example, although the Nepal Constitution provides sons and
daughters with equal rights to "ancestral property," inheritance of such
property is typically patrilineal in accordance with customary norms. 252 In
addition, the World Bank's World Development Report notes that land
scarcity is "acute" in most countries in Asia.253
Land scarcity, vestiges of discriminatory legal systems, and gendered
power structures favoring men are not unique to Rwanda or to Africa.
Understanding the ways in which these factors inhibit gender equality, and
finding solutions to overcome them, are also lessons for the international
development community.

land to recuperate its fertility, have been shortened. And in the absence of
increased use of fertilizer . . . the result is fast declining soil productivity.
Furthermore, crop cultivation is rapidly spilling into marginal and fragile
lands, where yields are not only very low but unsustainable, and the risk
of irreversible damage to the environment very high.
FOOD & AGRIc. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, Food Supply Situation and Crop Prospects in SubSaharan Africa - May 1996, available at http://www.fao.org/DOCREP/004/W1144E/
w1144e54.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2010).
250. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, Gender and Land Rights Database: South
Afica Country Report, available at http://www.fao.org/gender/landrights/report/ (select
"South Africa," then select "OK") (last visited Dec. 1, 2010).
251. FOOD & AGRIc. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, Gender and Land Rights Database: United
Republic of Tanzania Country Report, available at http://www.fao.org/gender/
landrights/report/ (select "United Republic of Tanzania," then select "OK") (last visited
December 1, 2010).
252. FOOD & AGRIc. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, Gender and Land Rights Database: Nepal

Country Report, available at http://www.fao.org/gender/landrights/report/ (select "Nepal,"
then select "OK") (last visited Feb. 5, 2011).
253. WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2008: AGRICULTURE FOR DEVELOPMENT
63 (2008).
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APPENDIX: METHODOLOGY

The analysis in this article relies on the Rwandan laws and policies
comprising Rwanda's land reforms, published data, and qualitative
research. The qualitative research included semi-structured interviews
conducted in Rwanda between July 16, 2009, and September 9, 2009.
Interviews were conducted in the Kigali, Southern, and Northern Provinces
of Rwanda. Seventy-three people were interviewed. Interviews in Kigali
were primarily with public officials and those who worked for public
agencies. In the Southern and Northern Provinces, men, women, farmers,
non-farmers, members of the abunzi, microcredit officers, public officials,
and members of civil society organizations were interviewed. Interviews in
the Southern Province were mainly conducted in or near Rukoma Sector, in
the Kamonyi District. Interviews in the Northern Province were conducted
in or near Byumba Sector, in the Gicumbi District. Interviewees were not
necessarily residents of either of these regions. To preserve anonymity,
interviewees were not asked where they resided. Most interviews were
conducted with the assistance of a translator, except when the respondents
were able to express themselves in French or English.
The qualitative research was exploratory in nature. The interviews
intended to identify areas of insecurity in land ownership and whether
those insecurities were faced more by one sex than the other. The data
collected from the respondents is not statistically robust, but can be used to
identify trends and as a starting point for further research. Analysis of the
qualitative questioning was combined with legal analysis and other data,
when available, to determine whether and what obstacles inhibit gender
equality with respect to land rights.
Respondents' answers are potentially subject to some level of bias.
Respondents may have provided certain answers which they perceived to
be "right," rather than true. Although every attempt was made to conduct
interviews in private spaces, this was not always possible.
Respondents were not selected systematically, nor were the
respondents selected entirely at random. People on the main roads and
found working on their farms were approached at random. In some cases,
as with some of the youth and widows, the researcher and her translator
found meeting places or centers dedicated to certain groups of people, and
asked to interview some of the group members. In other instances, people
who were interviewed found their friends and brought them over to be
Some respondents, seeing that interviews were being
interviewed.
conducted, affirmatively asked to be interviewed.
Every effort was made to interview people of all social strata and
vocations. However, without a list of names and occupations, it was
impossible to ensure inclusion of every possible group. In particular, while
respondents include people of different sexes, age groups, and marital and
land ownership statuses, the respondents did not include any domestic
workers, who were in any event unavailable to be interviewed without
being pulled away from their duties. The relative wealth of respondents
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was not asked, although it could be estimated by certain responses (e.g.,
whether they had enough land to rent to others, or had the means to pay
others to work on their land). In compliance with IRB protocol, persons
under the age of 18 were not interviewed.
All data is on file with the author, but is kept private to preserve
anonymity of respondents. Anonymity is maintained with respect to all
respondents, with the exception of public officials who specifically stated
that anonymity was not required.

